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INTRODUCTION

Since the late nineteenth century, the federal government has exercised the power of eminent domain' with respect to property owned by
state and local governments.2 The just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution s requires the federal govEminent domain has been defined as "the right belonging to a sovereignty to
take private property for its own public uses, and not for those of another." Kohl v.
United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1875); see also 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 1.11 (J. Sackman 3d ed. 1985) (Eminent domain is "the power of the sovereign to
take property for public use without the owner's consent." (footnote omitted)). For a
discussion of the origins of the eminent domain power, see infra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
2 For the purpose of convenience, counties, cities, towns, villages, boroughs, and
special districts will be collectively referred to in this article as "localities" or "local
governments." For a discussion of the distinctions among different types of local governments, see 1 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 2.012.52 (3d ed. 1987); 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW §§ 6-13 (1982). Under
current law, local governments are deemed to be subdivisions of the state in which they
are located, deriving all of their power from the state. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. Federal exercise of the power of eminent domain with respect to property
owned by states and localities will be referred to as "intergovernmental takings."
' "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa1
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ernment to compensate private property owners when it condemns their
property. Despite the absence of any reference to publicly owned property in the just compensation clause, federal courts have required the
United States to compensate states and localities when it takes their
property. In 1984, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the
question of why compensation must be paid for intergovernmental takings, and how that compensation should be computed.4 In United
States v. 50 Acres of Land,5 the Court unanimously held that public
condemnees should receive the same compensation as private condemnees,8 because the loss to a public entity may be as severe as the
loss to a private person or entity.7 In effect, the Court equated public
entities with private entities, with respect to both the rationale for compensation, and the method for computing that compensation.
In this Article, I will demonstrate that the justifications for compensating private and public property owners whose property is condemned' by the federal government are not congruent. Some of the
tion." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
" The Court had previously held that states and localities were entitled to compensation for intergovernmental takings. See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230
(1946) (condemnation of local property for federal post office and customhouse). Nevertheless, in Carmack the Court failed to consider in any detail the justification for compensation, or how compensation should be computed.
5 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
6 According to the Court, the appropriate measure of compensation is the condemned property's fair market value at the time of the taking. See id. at 33. For further
discussion of the concept of just compensation and the 50 Acres of Land case, see infra
text accompanying notes 254-79.
7 As the Court stated:
When the United States condemns a local public facility the loss to the
public entity, to the persons served by it, and to the local taxpayers may be
no less acute than the loss in the taking of private property. Therefore, it
is most reasonable to construe the reference to "private property" in the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as encompassing the property of
state and local governments when it is condemned by the United States.
50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 31 (footnote omitted).
I For the purposes of this Article, a "condemnation" will be treated as synonymous with an exercise by the federal government of its power of eminent domain. Unless specifically stated otherwise, all condemnations will be assumed to result from a
conscious decision by the federal government to appropriate property for federal use or
from physical damage to property caused by federal projects. See, e.g., Carmack, 329
U.S. 230 (1946) (condemnation of park, courthouse, city hall, and library for post office
and customhouse); Wayne County v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 417 (1918) (destruction
of public road by federal dam project), affd 252 U.S. 574 (1920). This Article does not
explicitly consider instances in which a federal regulation diminishes the value of property so as to constitute an implicit or regulatory taking. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979) (federal law prohibiting sale of objects containing eagle feathers is not a
taking); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (government order
temporarily closing gold mines-not a taking), reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958). Nevertheless, some of the present analysis would doubtless apply to regulatory takings.

832

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 137:829

functions served by compensating private condemnees have analogues to
functions served by compensating public property owners. Nevertheless,
by equating states and localities with private entities, the Court has
failed to recognize that the most compelling justification for compensating intergovernmental condemnees derives from the structure of our
constitutional system: A constitutional obligation to compensate intergovernmental condemnees protects the important role assigned to states
in our federal system. Once the problem of intergovernmental takings is
viewed in terms of the proper relationship between nation and state, it
becomes clear that the mechanics of compensation should not be dictated, as the Court in 50 Acres of Land indicates, by rules developed
for private condemnees. To the contrary, an appropriate compensation
rule must be one particularly suited to protecting states and localities
from the disruption and exploitation made possible by the federal
power of eminent domain.
In Part I of this Article, I describe how courts and commentators
have justified the federal power to condemn property owned by private
persons and public entities, and examine the judicial development of a
compensation requirement for intergovernmental takings.
In Part II, I develop a justification for compensating state and local governments. I examine each of the rationales offered by courts and
commentators for compensating private property owners and apply
these rationales to states and localities. Two reasons often given for
compensating private owners - preventing unfair and unequal economic burdens with respect to the costs of government, and minimizing
investment risk - are much less compelling justifications for compensation when the condemnee is a public entity. Although these two rationales for compensation are ultimately unpersuasive, a close examination of how they apply to public entities enables one to understand
better the nature of intergovernmental takings as well as their impact
on states and localities. The third justification for compensation, prevention of allocative inefficiency caused by fiscal illusion, supports a
compensation requirement, regardless of whether the condemnee is a
public or private entity. The most important justification for compensating states and localities derives from the role that compensation
serves in protecting the liberty of private citizens. Because states and
localities play a vital role in the nation's political process, a constitutional compensation requirement is necessary to protect states, localities, and their citizens from exploitative and disruptive rent-seeking.
In Part III, I discuss how just compensation is computed for private and public condemnees, and conclude by proposing an alternative
formula for compensating public entities. The "fair market value"
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method of computing compensation for private condemnees, (which the
Court in 50 Acres of Land has also required for public condemnees)
cannot be relied upon to protect states and localities from exploitation
and disruption. I argue that, rather than relying on the inapt analogy
between public and private condemnees, a more satisfactory method of
computing just compensation for intergovernmental takings can be derived from the principle of full indemnification.
I.

EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE
UNDER CURRENT LAW

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 9 In addition to omitting any reference to publicly
owned property, the Framers of the Constitution failed specifically to
empower the federal government to take property by eminent domain,
regardless of whether the property is owned by private or public
entities.
A.

The Power of Eminent Domain

Despite the absence of any express delegation of power in the
Constitution, the existence of a federal power of eminent domain has
not been seriously questioned since the mid-nineteenth century. 10 Although little is known about the deliberations leading to the inclusion
of the just compensation clause in the Bill of Rights, 1 it is likely that
the Framers were influenced by natural law theorists, most of whom
assumed that the state had the power to expropriate property. 2 This
U.S. CONsT.
10

amend. V.

See, e.g., United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (eminent

domain used to condemn land owned by rail company in order to preserve Gettysburg
battlefield); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) (federal government may take
private property without consent of state in which it is located). However, in 1845, the
Supreme Court stated that "the United States have [sic] no constitutional capacity to
exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain within the limits of a
state or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted." Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845).
11See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 99-100
(1973) [hereinafter F. BOSSELMAN]; E. PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DoMAIN 74 (1987).
11 See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 11, at 100; E. PAUL, supra note 11, at 74-77;
Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553, 559-60
(1972) [hereinafter Stoebuck, A General Theory]; Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings,
and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1076 (1980) [hereinafter Stoebuck,
Police Power]. But see Note, The Origins and OriginalSignificance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 710 & n.87 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Origins & Significance] (observing that while Madison was familiar
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power typically was justified on the ground that those who consented to
government implicitly agreed that private property must give way to
public power when necessary to achieve a public purpose. 3
In 1875, the Supreme Court held for the first time in Kohl v.
United States,14 that the federal government had the power to condemn
private property without the consent of the state in which the property
was located.' In finding that the United States government had the
power of eminent domain, Justice Strong, echoing the natural law
scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, argued that the
ability to take property was inseparable from the sovereignty of the
federal government. If the national government could be blocked by
state prohibitions or the unwillingness of property owners to sell their
property, the "constitutional grants of power may be rendered nugatory, and the government is [sic] dependent for its practical existence
upon the will of a State, or even upon that of a private citizen."'" The
Court expanded upon Kohl in United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Railway Company,'7 observing that the power of eminent domain is
implied because it is necessary and appropriate to the exercise of the
with writings of natural law scholars, he believed property rights were a creation of
positive law). In addition to natural law, the Framers were likely influenced by English
parliamentary and colonial practice. For examples of the exercise of eminent domain by
the English parliament and American colonial governments, see Stoebuck, A General
Theory, supra, at 575-83.
13 As Grotius maintained:

[Tihe property of subjects belongs to the state under the right of eminent
domain; in consequence the state, or he who represents the state, can use
the property of subjects, and even destroy or alienate it, not only in case of
direct need . . . but also for the sake of public advantage; and to the public advantage those very persons who formed the body politic should be
considered as desiring that private advantage should yield.
2 H. GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI Ac PAcis 807 (book III, ch. XX) (trans. 1925). Grotius and other natural law scholars who wrote on the power of eminent domain also
argued that the owner whose property was taken should be entitled to compensation.
See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
14 91 U.S. 367 (1875). In Kohl, private landowners challenged a federal condemnation of a parcel of land on which the government proposed to build a post office and
other public facilities.
13 See id. at 374. Prior to the act challenged in Kohl, the federal government
appropriated property in states by purchase, by instituting actions pursuant to state
law, by requesting that the state condemn property and transfer it to the federal government, or by gaining the consent of the state in which the property was located. See 1
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 1, at § 1.24; E. PAUL, supra note 11, at
159 n.10.
16 Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371. The Court also argued that the existence of the power of
eminent domain is implied by the just compensation clause. According to the Court, the
just compensation clause limits the power of eminent domain, hence the power must
exist in the first place. See id. at 372-73.
17 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
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federal government's delegated powers."8
In recent years, some commentators have questioned the wisdom of
the premise underlying the Kohl and Gettysburg Electric Railway decisions." Condemnation of property entails a forced exchange of property for which a court seeks to determine the price that a willing seller
would accept from a willing buyer."0 Critics of eminent domain argue
that the true value of property to a condemnee can be revealed only by
a consensual transfer. Partly as a result of insufficient information and
partly because of difficulties of computation, however, federal courts
have developed rules of convenience that leave condemnees uncompensated for certain elements of the property that they might value."
Because court-ordered compensation for a coerced sale is unlikely
to equal that to which a willing seller would agree, eminent domain is
considered economically inefficient. 2 Critics argue that in many instances the inefficiencies created by condemnations could be avoided by
requiring the government to purchase property through the private
market.23 Nevertheless, even those who criticize the power of eminent
domain admit that it might be necessary in certain circumstances. For
example, forced transfers may be required when a landowner has mo18 Id. at 679, 681.
19 See, e.g., R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW

194 (1988) (when
the government purchases from a small number of persons, it should not necessarily be
allowed to compel a sale at fair market value); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 49-50 (3d ed. 1986) (the government may not require the power of eminent domain when transaction costs are low).
20 See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
21 For example, fair market value compensation typically does not include compensation for business losses, relocation expenses, or court costs. See infra notes 250-53.
2 The criterion of efficiency preferred by many economists is named after a nineteenth-century economist, Vilfredo Pareto. An allocation of resources is Pareto efficient
if it is not possible to change the allocation to make someone better off, without making
someone else worse off. The concept of Pareto efficiency, however, has limited utility
since it is extremely difficult to conceive of any new policy that would not make someone worse off. A second measure of efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, is more frequently utilized in cost-benefit analysis. A given allocation of resources is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient if those made better off could compensate those made worse off. To meet the
requirements of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, actual compensation need not be paid. See G.
DOWNS & P. LARKEY, THE SEARCH FOR GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY 7 (1986).
Court-ordered compensation is unlikely to be Pareto efficient because it may not equal
the price the condemnee would voluntarily accept from a purchaser. The price differential indicates that the condemnee is worse off as a result of the condemnation. However,
the condemnation may be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because the government could, theoretically, redistribute the consumer surplus expropriated.
23 See R. POSNER, supra note 19, at 49 (in settings with low transaction costs, the
government should transact in the private market); Munch, An Economic Analysis of
Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473, 495 (1976) (eminent domain may not be
more efficient than consolidation through the free market); see also Stoebuck, A General Theory, supra note 12, at 560 (observing that it is "far from certain" that governments require the power of eminent domain).
AND ECONOMICS
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nopoly power, or in situations where transaction costs are high, either
as a result of strategic bargaining, or the existence of a large number of
landowners.2"
The rationales that support a federal power of eminent domain
with respect to private property also apply to federal takings of state
and local property, albeit in a somewhat attenuated fashion. It is improbable that a state or local government would bargain strategically,
seeking to appropriate the gains of a federal project for itself. Most
federal projects that involve intergovernmental takings create significant
benefits for states and localities, benefits which might be jeopardized by
such bargaining.2 5 Nevertheless, in exercising its constitutionally delegated powers, the federal government might require specific property
with which a state or locality would not willingly part, either because
of its value to the public entity, or because the state or locality wished
to block a project that it viewed as undesirable. In these instances the
federal power to condemn state and local property seems both necessary
and justified to ensure that the United States government is able to
exercise fully its constitutional authority.26
Since the late nineteenth century, federal courts have upheld the
authority of the federal government to condemn property owned by
24 See R. POSNER, supra note 19, at 49-50. If the federal government did not have
the power to condemn property, it would be forced to bargain with property owners. If
only one particular parcel of property were appropriate for the government project, the
owner of that parcel would have monopoly power with respect to the government. The
owner would be able to extract from the government a price in excess of the opportunity cost for the property, thereby converting public surplus to private surplus. If the
government and the property owner were each to bargain strategically (i.e., hold out for
a price either higher or lower than the price they would otherwise accept), transaction
costs would increase, potentially leading to inefficient results. For example, the parties
might be unable to agree on a purchase price despite it being in the interests of both to
consummate a sale. Alternatively, the transaction costs could be so high as to make an
otherwise efficient project too expensive. Transaction costs would be multiplied for
projects requiring property from many different owners. See Merrill, The Economics of
Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 74-75 (1986) [hereinafter Merrill, Economics of
Public Use].
25 See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text. In many cases, not only does the
state or locality submit to the federal eminent domain power without complaint, but
frequently it contributes property to the federal project either for no money or for nominal reimbursement. Interview with Monroe Lesser, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Washington, D.C. June 13, 1988).
2 A federal condemnation of public property against the wishes of the state or
locality raises issues regarding the appropriate relationships among the federal government, states, and localities in our federal system. Under the conception of federalism set
forth herein, federal power to coerce property transfers from states and localities is
acceptable, provided that sufficient compensation is paid to the state or locality to enable it to replace the condemned property, if the state or locality can show that the
facility taken provided a benefit that would not be as fully provided after the condemnation. See infra text accompanying notes 280-88.
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states and localities. In 1887, in Stockton v. Baltimore & N.YR. Co.,2"
a federal appeals court upheld a federal law authorizing the condemnation of state property for construction of a railroad bridge. The court
observed that the federal government had constitutionally delegated
powers with respect to interstate commerce and that the exercise of
these powers would frequently necessitate the acquisition of publicly
owned property.28 A requirement that the federal government obtain
the state's consent to appropriate publicly owned property would permit states to stand in the way of the execution of these constitutionally
vested powers. 29 The power of eminent domain with respect to state
property, like the power to condemn private property, was necessary
for the federal government to exercise its powers.3 0 Later Supreme
Court cases affirmed the principle that the national government must
32
have the power3 to condemn state and local property.
27 32 F. 9 (1887).
28 See id. at 20-21.

See id. at 16-17.
30 See id. at 17-19.
31 Some federal courts adopted rules of construction which had the effect of limiting the federal eminent domain power with respect to property which was already
being used for public purposes. Under the test of "superior public use," when the federal government sought to condemn property already being used by a state or local
government for public purposes, and the legislation authorizing the taking made no
express provision for condemnation of public property, some courts required a showing
that the proposed federal use was higher and superior to the public use of the state or
locality. See, e.g., United States v. City of Tiffin, 190 F. 279, 282 (C.C.N.D. Ohio
1911) (requiring judicial determination of whether use of land for post office was more
important than use of land for public alley); In re Certain Land in Lawrence, 119 F.
453, 456 (D. Mass. 1902) (suggesting, but not deciding, that use for post office was
superior to use for public park).
Under the doctrine of "prior public use," some courts held that property already
devoted to a public use could not be taken, absent legislation which authorized the
taking in express words or by necessary implication. See, e.g., United States v. 929.70
Acres of Land, 205 F. Supp. 456, 457 (D.S.D. 1962) (Congress expressly or impliedly
included property within authorization statute by specifically mentioning it in legislative reports); United States v. Sixty Acres, 28 F. Supp. 368, 372 (E.D. Ill. 1934) (finding that Congress implied condemnation of lands at issue, because they would be destroyed by federal dam project); United States v. Certain Land In Town of New
Castle, 165 F. 783, 788-89 (C.C.D.N.H. 1908) (general federal authorization to
purchase land not specific enough to permit condemnation of land devoted to prior
public use). The doctrine of prior public use has been disapproved of or severely limited by subsequent cases. See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242-43
(1946) (upholding authority of government officials to choose specific sites owned by
city for federal facilities based upon general congressional authorization); United States
v. Certain Parcels of Land in Town of Denton, 30 F. Supp. 372, 379 (D. Md. 1939)
(doctrine of prior public use not applicable when Congress delegates the power to select
post office sites).
32 See Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946) (condemnation of park, courthouse, city
hall, and library for post office and customhouse); United States v. Gettysburg Elec.
Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (condemnation of land owned by rail company for preservation of Gettysburg battlefield); Wayne County v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 417 (1918)
29
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Compensation For Intergovernmental Takings

Once federal courts decided that the federal power of eminent domain extended to state and local property, they were faced with the
question of whether compensation should be paid to public condemnees.
Although courts encountered no textual or doctrinal impediment to
finding that states and localities should be treated as private individuals
with respect to an implied power of eminent domain, the fifth amendment's express requirement of compensation for private property made
extension of compensation to public entities problematic. 3 Neverthe(destruction of county road as result of dam project), affd, 252 U.S. 574 (1920);
United States v. Town of Nahant, 153 F. 520 (1st Cir.) (1907) (condemnation of town
sewer for fortifications and coast defenses). Nevertheless, some courts and commentators
have indicated that the power of the national government to condemn state and local
property might be limited by federalism concerns. See, e.g., United States v. 4,450.72
Acres of Land, 27 F. Supp. 167, 175 (D. Minn. 1939) (lack of limits on eminent
domain would give federal government power to "arbitrarily imperil the very functions
of the state itself"), affd, 125 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1942); C. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN § 60 (1894) (maintaining that "in a controversy between the
United States and a State the Supreme Court may [base its decision on relative state
and federal interests] in order to fairly protect the agencies of the State"). But see
Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941) (tenth amendment is no
bar to condemnation of state property for dam project); St. Louis v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 101 (1893) (implies in dicta that federal government could condemn statehouse if it paid compensation to state).
" Few clues exist to shed light on whether the just compensation clause was intended to mandate compensation for intergovernmental takings. Very little direct evidence exists regarding why the clause was included in the fifth amendment. See infra
notes 46-54 and accompanying text. It is quite possible that despite the reference to
private property, the just compensation clause was also intended to mandate compensation when the federal government appropriated property owned by states and localities.
Historical evidence suggests that at least with respect to property owned by localities,
the line distinguishing public and private property was blurred throughout the eighteenth century. Localities, even those that did not possess corporate charters, were
treated by courts as corporations. See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 100
(1947); Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1098 (1980)
[hereinafter Frug, City as Legal Concept]. Municipal corporations, such as New York
City, were not characterized as "public" corporations because at the time no conceptual
dichotomy existed to distinguish public from private corporations. See H. HARTOG,
PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER 184-85 (1983); Frug, supra, at 1102; Frug,
Property and Power: Hartog on the Legal History of New York City (Book Review),
1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 673, 673 [hereinafter Frug, Property and Power]. Instead, the eighteenth century American city was a corporation whose "property and
governmental rights were blurred and mixed." H. HARTOG, supra, at 21. It was not
until the nineteenth century that courts developed a uniform system of local government
law along with the government/proprietary distinction to separate local government
powers and private property into public and private spheres. See Frug, Property and
Power, supra, at 676-77 (discussing the legal treatment of New York City); Williams,
The Development of the Publicl PrivateDistinction in American Law (Book Review),
64 TEx. L. REV. 225, 233 (1985) (discussing the public/private characterization of
localities in Massachusetts and certain other New England states).
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less, this interpretive difficulty was a matter of little concern to most
federal courts. After the Stockton 84 case was decided, federal courts,
without even discussing the omission of public property from the just
compensation clause, held that states and localities were entitled to
compensation when their property was taken by eminent domain. 5
Most courts that noted the seeming incongruity between compensating
public condemnees and the text of the just compensation clause avoided
the problem by conclusively equating private property with publicly
owned property.3
Some courts, however, did attempt to develop rationales for treating publicly owned property in the same manner as property owned by
private individuals. For example, in 50 Acres of Land, Justice Stevens
implied that a taking of publicly owned land might harm the citizens
who collectively comprise the public entity as much as a taking from
each individual separately. Because each citizen pays taxes to the
public entity and those revenues are used to purchase and maintain its
property, a taking by the federal government would burden each private citizen by expropriating his or her share of the collectively held
asset.
A more thoughtful, if somewhat obscure, reason for treating state
and local property as private property under the just compensation
clause was suggested by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y.R. Co., 32 F. 9 (1887).
See, e.g, Carmack, 329 U.S. at 242 ("[W]hen the Federal Government thus
takes for a federal public use the independently held and controlled property of a state
or a local subdivision, the Federal Government recognizes its obligation to pay just
compensation for it and it is conceded in this case that the Federal Government must
pay.. . ."); United States v. Town of Nahant, 153 F. 520, 521 (1st Cir. 1907) ("[B]ut
having thus, under the strong arm of sovereignty, cut through private and municipal
right, the rigor of the arm shall be relaxed, and the government itself will see that just
compensation is awarded accordingly."). One reason many courts did not distinguish
between privately owned and publicly owned property may be that property owned by
a municipality was frequently considered to be held in a "proprietary" capacity. See
Nahant, 153 F. at 521 (characterizing the taking of a local sewer as a taking of "private or municipal property"); see also supra note 33 (line between public and private
property blurred in eighteenth century). For a discussion of the public/private distinction with respect to takings of local property by states, see infra note 39.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler Township, 66 F.2d 977, 982 (8th Cir. 1933)
("[T]he amendment reads that 'private property cannot be taken for public use, without just compensation'. . . yet 'private,' as thus used, includes property which is ordinarily regarded as public property. . . ." (emphasis in original)); Wayne County v.
United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 417, 424 (1918) ("While such [county] property is within
most of the definitions of public and not private property, we are of the opinion that for
purposes of compensation as for a taking under the Constitution it is properly to be
regarded as private property. . . ."), afi'd, 252 U.S. 574 (1920).
87 See 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 31.
14
35

840

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 137:829

Town of Bedford v. United States."8 In Bedford, the United States condemned a portion of a town road for use in building a veterans hospital. The United States claimed that it had no obligation to pay compensation for the road because under Massachusetts law, no compensation
would have been required if the property had been expropriated by the
Commonwealth. 9 In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that
the relationship between the federal government and a state subdivision
was qualitatively different from the relationship between a state and
one of its own subdivisions. A municipality or town is considered to be
a creation of the state and, as such, is subject to the unlimited power of
its creator with respect to public property.40 The United States, how38 23 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1927). The Bedford court also justified compensation by
adopting a rationale similar to the one used by Justice Stevens in 50 Acres of Land.
See 23 F.2d at 454 (federal condemnations of public facilities increase financial burdens
on taxpayers).
" Id. at 453. Because local governments are deemed creatures of the state under
most states' laws, see infra note 40, states have considerable freedom to take local government property without compensation. Many states' laws make the compensation
requirement depend on the government/proprietary distinction. If property is owned
and used by a local government in its "public capacity," no compensation would be
required in the event of a state condemnation. Property owned or used by local governments in their "private capacity," however, may not be taken without compensation.
See City of Worcester v. Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 99, 100, 185 N.E.2d 633, 634
(1962); 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 1, at § 2.225[1]; see also Dau,
Problems in Condemnation of Property Devoted To Public Use, 44 TEX. L. REV.
1517, 1527-30 (1966) (discussing when the government/proprietary distinction requires compensation, and when the distinction may be avoided by statutory construction); Payne, Intergovernmental Condemnation as a Problem in Public Finance, 61
TEX. L. REV. 949, 955 (1983) (noting that "the distinction requires compensation
whenever the public property involved in the taking can be classified as 'proprietary,'
while continuing to deny it for 'governmental' property"); Note, The Sovereign's Duty
to Compensatefor the Appropriation of Public Property, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1083,
1092-98 (1967) (tracing the development and discussing the content of the government/
proprietary distinction). Courts and commentators have criticized the government/proprietary distinction as empty. See Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 57-61, 284 N.E.2d
733, 735-36 (1972) (analyzing municipal liability); Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra
note 33, at 1128-41 (public/private distinction has eroded).
"I See Bedford, 23 F.2d at 456-57. The "creature of the state" characterization of
localities is derived from the writings of Judge John F. Dillon. Under Dillon's Rule,
local governments possess only those powers expressly given them by the state. Local
government powers, therefore, are to be strictly construed. See 1 J. DILLON, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55, at 174, § 111, at 154-55 (2d ed. 1873); E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.08a (3d ed. 1971); see also
Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The
Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIs. L. REv. 83, 88-89 (discussing
Dillon's Rule); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) ("Municipal
corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.").
For a critique of the conception of localities as instrumentalities of states, see Neuman,
TerritorialDiscrimination,Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 261, 304-05 (1987). For a critique of the local powerlessness fostered by Dillon's
Rule, see Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 33, at 1067-73, 1109-13.
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ever, is a "stranger to the town""' and therefore must treat municipal
property as it would property owned by private individuals."2
II.

JUSTIFYING COMPENSATION FOR PUBLIC CONDEMNEES

Before determining an appropriate method of compensating public
condemnees, one must first consider whether a constitutional rule mandating compensation for intergovernmental takings is necessary. Only
occasionally have courts attempted to explain why the federal government must compensate states and localities when it condemns their
property, and those explanations have been sketchy at best. In this
Part, I examine the most commonly offered rationales for compensating
private individuals and entities, and consider whether or not these rationales apply to public condemnees. Two justifications for compensation, preventing an unfair distribution of the burdens of government
and minimizing investment risk, do not support a compensation requirement for public condemnees. The remaining two rationales for
compensating private condemnees, eliminating the problem of fiscal illusion and protecting liberty, do justify an interpretation of the just
compensation clause that would require compensation for intergovernmental takings.
A. Preventing Unfair Distribution of Burdens of Government
Courts and commentators have frequently suggested that the just
compensation clause was included in the Bill of Rights to prohibit unfair distribution of the costs of government among citizens."3 Although
few. would argue that the burdens of government actions must be distributed in a precisely equal fashion among all citizens, 4 there is a
Bedford, 23 F.2d at 457.
Implicit in the "stranger to the town" metaphor are concerns about the proper
relationship between the federal government, and states and localities in our federal
system. The court's reasoning in Bedford may be a reflection of the contemporaneous
conception of federal/state relations commonly referred to as dual federalism. Within
their respective spheres, the federal government and the states were thought of as sovereign and independent. See infra note 176.
41

42

"s See, e.g, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-6 (2d ed. 1988)

(discussing the compensation requirement as an attempt to limit sacrifice by a minority
of the population); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments On The
Ethical Foundationsof 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1218-24
(1967) (discussing John Rawls' "justice as fairness" theory).
44 Among modern commentators, Professor Epstein comes closest to this absolute
view. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 204-09 (1985) (discussing disproportionate impact test). Some commentators
have suggested that one purpose of the just compensation clause was to prevent redistribution of wealth. See, e.g., Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why The Takings Issue is
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consensus that the just compensation clause protects against the sacrifice of the few to the many. 5 In this section, I summarize the historical
argument that the just compensation clause was included in the fifth
amendment to prevent unfair burdens, and examine the extent to which
federal courts have adopted this rationale. I argue that if the objective
of the just compensation requirement is prevention of unfair burdens, a
court computing compensation ideally should compensate only actual
burdens, by reducing the amount paid to a condemnee by the amount
she benefits from the project for which her property was condemned.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that most intergovernmental takings
generate significant benefits for the states and localities whose property
is condemned. The existence of such benefits makes the case for compensating *public entities much weaker than the case for compensating
private property owners.
1. Preventing Unfair Burdens: History and Precedent
Although comparatively little is known regarding the origins of the
just compensation clause, historical evidence supports the view that one
of the purposes of the compensation requirement was to protect citizens
from unequal treatment. The sixteenth and seventeenth century natural
law theorists, whose views concerning eminent domain are thought to
have influenced the Framers, wrote that when government exercises its
power of eminent domain it should compensate the condemnee." According to Pufendorf, compensation was appropriate because the property "seized and applied to public purposes

. . .

exceeds the proportion

which he [the condemnee] was bound to contribute to the state."47 At
Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 583-87 (1984) (arguing that one purpose of
just compensation clause was to avoid redistribution). Cf. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 176 (1913)
("None of the powers conferred by the Constitution on Congress permits a direct attack
on property."). But see Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 58-67
(1964) (purpose of just compensation clause was protection of liberty, not maintenance
of wealth).
" See E. PAUL, supra note 11, at 75 (approving of an interpretation of the just
compensation clause that would prohibit anyone from being compelled to pay more
than his or her "fair share" of public improvements); L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at § 96, ("the just compensation requirement appears to express a limit on government's
power to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice to the general good"). But cf.Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. L. REV. 1561, 1579-80
(1986) (criticizing the equal sharing rationale) [hereinafter Merrill, Rent Seeking].
"I See, e.g, H. GRoTius, supra note 13, at 807 (bk. III, ch. XX) (when exercising
the right of eminent domain "the state is bound to make good. . . the damage to those
who lose their property"); 2 S.PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINES ET CIVIS JUXTA
LEGEM NATURALEM 136 (F. Moore trans. 1927) (expressing the same principle).
"' S. PUFENDORF, supra note 46, at 136.
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the time of the American Revolution, English statutes typically provided for compensation when the government expropriated land,4" despite the absence of such a requirement in the Magna Carta."' Blackstone wrote that individuals were entitled to compensation: Parliament
must not act "by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an
arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and
equivalent for the injury thereby sustained." 50
Prior to independence, colonial governments regularly paid compensation to citizens whose property was condemned.5 1 By the time the
Constitution was ratified, two states had included compensation clauses
in their constitutions.52 Nevertheless, no state requested inclusion of a
takings provision in the Constitution or Bill of Rights.53 Despite the
apparent lack of interest among the states in a federal compensation
requirement, James Madison included the just compensation clause in
the fifth amendment. Madison's writings indicate that he was concerned with the prospect that the government might inflict unfair burdens upon individuals or groups of citizens.54
48 See E. PAUL, supra note 11, at 72 ("By tradition ...
land could be taken only
by a parliamentary act accompanied by the payment of compensation."); Stoebuck, A
General Theory, supra note 12, at 579 ("Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries compensation became a regular feature of English parliamentary acts.").
4' The Magna Carta provides that "No free man shall be . . . disseised . . .
except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA
art. 39.
"I See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139. Blackstone's writings were very
influential in the United States at the time the Constitution and Bill of Rights were
adopted. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 112 (2d ed. 1985) (noting
the "ubiquity of Blackstone"); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 14 (1969) (same). Blackstone argued that while "the good of the individual ought
to yield to that of the community. . . it would be dangerous to allow any private Man,
or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether
it be expedient or no." W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at *139. For a discussion of the dangers to liberty that might result from uncompensated takings, see infra notes 128-41
and accompanying text.
"1See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 11, at 85 (colonial governments usually paid
compensation for developed land); Stoebuck, A General Theory, supra note 12, at 57983 (compensation paid for developed or enclosed land).
" See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 11, at 94-97 (discussing compensation clauses in
the Vermont and Massachusetts constitutions); Grant, The "Higher Law" Background
of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. L. REv. 67, 70 (1931) (same).
" See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 11, at 98; E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF

162, 173-205 (1st ed. 1957); McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the RelationshipBetween IndividRIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY

ual Liberties and ConstitutionalStructure, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 282-88 (1988).
" See Property, Nat'l Gazette, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14 J. MADISON, THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON

266, 267 (R. Rutland & T. Mason eds. 1983) (criticizing unequal

taxation of property). Madison may have been primarily concerned with the potential
inroads to personal liberty that absence of a compensation requirement would have
made possible. See id. at 266-68; Note, Origins and Significance, supra note 12, at
708-13 (discussing Madison's liberalism as reflected in the fifth amendment). See also
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Courts have applied the just compensation clause with the rhetoric, if not always the spirit,5 5 of preventing unfair burdens. According
to one commonly cited maxim, the just compensation requirement is
designed to prevent "the public from loading upon one individual more
than his just share of the burdens of government. . ."" In practice,
however, courts have been criticized for not requiring compensation in
circumstances where government regulation imposes significant burdens, and for undercompensating condemnees in instances where a taking is found to have occurred.5"
2.

Burdens and Benefits

Under current federal law, condemnees are entitled to receive as
compensation the fair market value of the property condemned. Nevertheless, if the objective of the just compensation requirement is to prevent an unfair distribution of the burdens created by government action, particular attention should be given to actual, rather than
nominal burdens borne by condenmees. If the federal project for which
property is taken benefits the condemnee, the actual burden to the individual condemnee would be equal to the value of the property condemned, minus the benefits that accrue to the condemnee from the government action. In effect, such a compensation rule5" would require
infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing the role-of property in preserving
individual liberty).
" In practice, federal courts permit property owners to bear significant losses resulting from government regulation without requiring compensation. See, e.g., Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (local action prohibiting
owner of historic structure from building a tower is not a compensable taking);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 413-14 (1928) (local law requiring abandonment of brick making which reduced value of property from $800,000 to $60,000 is
not a compensable taking). For thoughtful analyses of current takings jurisprudence,
see generally, B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977);
R. EPSTEIN, supra note 44; Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional
Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); Michelman, supra note
43; Rose, supra note 44; Sax, supra note 44; Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L. REV. 149 (1971).
" Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). See
also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3147 n. 4 (1987) ("One of
the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.'" (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960) and citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123).
" See supra note 55 (regulatory takings), and infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text (condemnations).
5 Obviously, requiring such a calculation on a case-by-case basis for private, as
well as public condemnees, might be difficult, time-consuming and expensive. Because
benefits to individual private condemnees from projects requiring takings are liable to
be small in magnitude, see infra note 69 and accompanying text, and the transaction
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courts to offset against the nominal value of the property taken, the
"implicit in-kind benefits" received by the condemnee.59
The proposition that compensation might not be necessary if the
individual who suffers the burden of condemnation receives implicit inkind benefits from the project or policy that created the loss, is not
unprecedented in the law. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,6 0 the
Supreme Court held that a state law that prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause subsidence constituted a compensable taking of property under the just compensation clause.6 1 In his
decision, Justice Holmes distinguished an earlier Supreme Court decision, Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,62 that had upheld a statute
requiring mining companies to leave pillars of coal underground so as
to protect miners in adjoining mines. Justice Holmes argued that the
statute challenged in Plymouth Coal did not constitute a taking because
it "secured an average reciprocity of advantage." 6 3 Although the statute
at issue in Plymouth Coal created a burden for mine owners by requiring them to leave pillars of coal underground, compensation was not
costs of calculating in-kind benefits large, it might be more cost-effective for the condemnor to compensate nominal, rather than actual burdens. Therefore, practical considerations of convenience and efficiency may justify basing compensation for private
condemnees on nominal, rather than actual burdens. Cf.Michelman, supra note 43, at
1215 (no compensation should be paid if settlement costs exceed the "demoralization
costs" that would be created by an uncompensated taking). Nevertheless, if the purpose
of the just compensation clause is to prevent disproportionate or unfair burdens, the
"ideal" compensation rule (absent transaction and administrative costs) would be indemnification for actual burdens only.
11 See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 195-215 (arguing that certain takings might
not require compensation if implicit in-kind benefits are taken into account); Cf.
Hagman, Windfallsfor Wipeouts, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEoUTs: LAND VALUE CAPTORE AND COMPENSATION 20, 20-27 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski, eds. 1978) (advocating recapture of windfalls created by government action and compensation for government-induced wipeouts).
60 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
61 PennsylvaniaCoal was the first Supreme Court case to hold that a government
regulation could constitute a taking of property under the just compensation clause. In
Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes set forth a test to determine when a regulation
becomes a taking, a test which has puzzled generations of jurists, attorneys, and property owners: "The general rule, at least, is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 260 U.S. at
415. Scholars have expended much time and energy analyzing Pennsylvania Coal and
its "general rule." See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 55, at 156-167 (1977) (characterizing the opinion as "the most important and most mysterious writing in takings
law"); Bender, The Takings Clause: Principlesor Politics?,34 BUFFALO L. REV. 735,
770-776 (1985) (there is "no justification [for the test] except [Justice Holmes'] overwhelming desire to shape the takings jurisprudence"); Rose, supra note 44, at 562
(identifying the "general rule" as the original source of the confusion in takings
analysis).
62 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
63 260 U.S. at 415.
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required because those same owners would receive in-kind benefits
from identical restrictions placed upon other mine owners. Apparently
Justice Holmes felt compensation was required in Pennsylvania Coal,
in part, because the mine owners did not receive similar in-kind benefits from the state law prohibiting subsidence.6 4
Many non-compensable public regulations of land use have also
been justified, at least in part, on the ground that they generate in-kind
benefits. For example, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,"5 the Supreme
Court considered the validity of a zoning ordinance that limited to five
the maximum number of single family residences that could be built on
a particular parcel of land. The Court stated in dicta that the zoning
restriction did not constitute a taking,"6 noting that the ordinance benefited the restricted landowner, as well as the public, by promoting orderly development. According to the Court, "[a]ppellants therefore will
share with other owners the benefits and burdens of the city's exercise
of its police power. In assessing the fairness of zoning ordinances, these
benefits must be considered along with any diminution in market value
that the appellants might suffer."6 "
Courts have not limited the practice of offsetting benefits or inkind compensation to the burdens imposed by government regulation.
See Rose, supra note 44, at 582.
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
66 The Court's discussion of the zoning ordinance's applicability to Agins's property was dicta because Agins had not, at the time of the litigation, submitted a plan to
develop the property and therefore, no concrete controversy regarding application of the
ordinance existed. See id. at 260.
6" Id. at 262. See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 491 (1987) (while each person is burdened by the restriction, they also benefit
from the restriction); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147-50
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same). In Penn Central, the Supreme Court held
that an historic preservation ordinance which limited the ability of owners of designated
buildings to make structural alterations was not a taking. Both the majority and the
dissenting opinions made use of the concept of offsetting benefits. Justice Brennan's
majority opinion noted that although the New York City ordinance might prohibit the
appellant from building a tower over Grand Central Station, the owner was not denied
all use of its air rights. Under the law, the owner of a property designated as historic
was permitted to transfer his or her "air rights" to nearby locations. The Court admitted that the transferable development rights might not constitute just compensation if a
taking had occurred, but that they "undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens
the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in
considering the impact of regulation." 438 U.S. at 137. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that what distinguishes historic preservation ordinances from other land
use regulations, such as zoning, is that they fail to provide reciprocal benefits. With a
zoning ordinance "any such abstract decrease in value will more than likely be at least
partially offset by an increase in value which flows from similar restrictions as to use
on neighboring properties . . . ." 438 U.S. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For
landmarked buildings, on the other hand, "a relatively few individual buildings, all
separated from one another, are singled out and treated differently from surrounding
buildings [so] no such reciprocity exists." Id.
65
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When a portion of a tract of land is condemned by the federal government and the remaining land is increased in value as a result of the
government action, courts will frequently require that the compensation
paid to the landowner for the portion taken be decreased by the value
of the benefit to the remainder.6
3.

Prevention of Unfair Burdens as a Rationale for Compensating
Intergovernmental Condemnees

Historical evidence indicates that the just compensation clause was
included in the fifth amendment, at least in part, to prevent individual
property owners from bearing unfair burdens. To achieve this purpose,
a property owner ideally should be compensated only for her actual
burdens. Benefits generated by the project for which the owner's property was condemned should be offset against the value of the property
taken. In this section, I argue that although compensation for private
property owners is usually justified as necessary to prevent unfair burdens, the same rationale cannot be applied to public condemnees: Intergovernmental takings typically do not create actual burdens for state
and local governments, unfair or otherwise.
When property is taken from a private individual for a public project, that individual suffers a concentrated loss, but is likely to be the
recipient of only a small proportion of a widely dispersed benefit. The
benefit, which might be considerable for the entire population of the
locality or state, is unlikely to be large enough at the individual level to
offset the burden created by the condemnation."' On the other hand, if
a locality or a state is regarded as a surrogate for its residents, a taking
of local or state property is likely to inflict a concentrated loss which is
68 A court will not require benefits to be offset against the value of the property
unless they are "special" rather than "general". See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548,
574-75 (1897). The exact nature of a special benefit is somewhat unclear. One leading
commentator on the question of whether benefits can be offset against compensation has
noted that "[u]pon this subject there is a great diversity of opinion and more rules,
different from and inconsistent with each other, have been laid down than upon any
other point in the law of eminent domain." 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra
note 1, at § 8.62. A special benefit is generally one that arises "from the peculiar
relation of the land in question to the public improvement" whereas a general benefit
arises "from the fulfillment of the public object which justified the taking." Id. at
§ 8.6203. If the benefit is one shared in common with the entire community it is likely
that it will be classified as general rather than special and therefore its value will not be
offset against the amount of compensation owed a condemnee.
6 To quote Justice Holmes, at the individual level there does not exist for most
condemnations an "average reciprocity of advantage" sufficient to make compensation

unnecessary. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see supra
notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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offset by a corresponding concentrated benefit.7 While the state or locality is presumably burdened by losing the use of its property, a large
proportion of the benefits generated by the federal project are concentrated in the same state or locality. In effect, whereas the actual burden
from uncompensated takings would usually be great for private individuals, it is likely to be non-existent or small for public entities. 1
Empirical evidence supports the view that intergovernmental takings typically generate significant benefits for the locality or state which
70 There might be instances in which the condemned public property benefitted
one group of citizens whereas the federal project for which the condemnation occurred
benefits a distinctly different segment of the population, thereby inflicting actual burdens on some residents. I contend, however, that it is inappropriate to assess the existence of actual burdens resulting from intergovernmental takings at the level of each
resident. In most cases, individual residents of states and localities have no entitlement
to benefits generated by particular parcels of publicly owned property. To the contrary,
states and localities frequently change the use of public property, despite the fact that
some segments of the population will benefit from the change at the expense of others.
Because public property is held in trust for all residents, collective benefits and burdens
are the appropriate indicator for determining whether an intergovernmental taking imposes actual burdens. Nevertheless, the fact that the federal government, rather than the
state or local property owner, makes the allocative decision, raises questions regarding
the appropriate relationship among the federal government and the states and localities
in the American federal system. See infra text accompanying notes 202-38.
71 City of Van Buren v. United States, 697 F.2d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1983), is one
case in which a court dealt with the issue of whether benefits to a state or locality
should be offset against burdens in determining whether there exists a federal obligation to compensate for an intergovernmental taking. The federal government argued
that damage to Van Buren's sewer lines caused by a federal dam project did not constitute a compensable taking because substantial benefits to the municipality generated by

the dam "clearly outweigh[ed] the detriments .

. . ."

Id. at 1061. The court rejected

the government's argument on two grounds. First, the court argued that nothing in the
record supported the government's contention that the damages sustained by the city
were "de minimis" compared to the benefits generated by the federal project. See id. at
1062. Second, the court held that only special benefits could be offset against compensation otherwise due to a condemnee and the benefits generated by the dam project were
general rather than special. See id.
The Van Buren court, like many courts considering intergovernmental taking
cases, see supra notes 35-36, borrowed rules from private condemnation cases without
considering whether those rules make sense in the context of a taking of public property. The reason most commonly given for refusing to offset general benefits (benefits
that the entire community shares) against the value of property condemned is that "the
owner whose land is taken is placed in a worse position than his neighbor whose estate
lies outside the path of the improvement and who shares in the increased values without any pecuniary loss." 3 NIcHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 1, at § 8.6205.
The argument that offsetting general benefits against compensation owed to private
condemnees would be inequitable may have some merit. But see Haar & Hering, The
Determination of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 833, 874 (1963)
(arguing that as long as a property owner receives full value for what she gives up she
has no right to complain about better bargain of neighbor). However, this argument
simply is not applicable to situations in which public land is condemned. Because the
entire community bears the cost of the taking as well as enjoys the general benefits of
the federal project (by definition), no inequity results from offsetting general as well as
special benefits.
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formerly owned the condemned property. Benefits attributable to federal programs may be categorized as "general," "local," or "group". 2
A general benefit is a collective good that accrues to all citizens in relatively equal shares. Examples of general benefits include national security, and research and development. A local benefit is one that is
primarily confined to a particular geographic area, whether it be a locality, state or region. Local benefits include increased employment of
local residents, and the economic growth and prosperity generated by
federal projects and public improvements. 3 A group benefit typically
affects the interests of readily identifiable groups of citizens who, in
7
many instances, may be dispersed throughout the United States. , Ex-

amples of group benefits include tax preferences for certain industries,
and subsidies earmarked for particular demographic groups. A government program need not, and usually does not generate only one type of
benefit.75 Military projects, for example, usually create all three types
of benefits. All citizens of the United States benefit from increased national security; 8 the economy of the locality or state in which the installation is located benefits from increased employment and economic
stimulus; 7 7 and certain manufacturers of military technology and hard72 See Arnold, The Local Roots of Domestic Policy, in THE NEW CONGRESS 250,
253 (T. Mann & N. Ornstein eds. 1981).
11 The distinction between general and local benefits is not an analogue of the
government/proprietary distinction. Characterizing a program or policy as generating
predominantly local benefits does not imply that the benefits are any less "public" than
a program which generates mostly general benefits. The characterization of benefits as
predominantly local merely means that they are concentrated on a group of citizens,
most of whom reside in close proximity, rather than being proportionately dispersed
throughout the nation. Most federal programs and policies will generate general, local,
and group benefits. Although it may be difficult in some cases to determine whether the
benefits generated by a particular program or policy are predominantly general or local, determining the incidence of benefits should be considerably easier and more meaningful than divining whether a particular government initiative generates private or
public benefits.
74 See Arnold, supra note 72, at 253.
75 Cf Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 URB. LAW. 553, 556
(1987) (virtually all public policy issues involve potential national, state, and city
interests).
78 This assumes, of course, that increased military spending yields some corresponding increase in the level of national security. See, e.g., A. GREGOR & M. CHANG,
THE IRON TRIANGLE 116 (1984) (pointing out that the United States' investment in
nuclear superiority did little to deter Soviet aggression in Africa, the Caribbean, and
Asia).
77 See R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY 95 (1979) ("The principal military benefit sought by congressmen is assumed to be military employment. Such
employment, even at a small installation, can pump millions of federal dollars into a
local economy every year."). That military installations generate enormous local benefits can be seen from observing efforts by Congressmen to influence the Department of
Defense to open facilities in their districts and to forestall efforts to close existing installations. See, e.g., id. at 114 (bureaucrats take into account committee members' prefer-
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ware earn profits supplying necessary equipment.
An analysis of all federal condemnations since 198078 confirms the
hypothesis that the projects for which public property has been condemned generate predominantly local benefits. Of 146 federal ventures
which involved intergovernmental takings, the largest proportion by far,
forty-five percent, were harbor, reservoir, and flood control projects.
Federal water projects are generally considered to be the prototypical
local benefit program.7 9 Although some of these projects generate general benefits, most commentators suggest that their popularity stems
from concentrated local benefits such as economic development and employment.8 ° Most of the remaining intergovernmental takings during
the 1980's involved undertakings which also generate substantial local
benefits.8
Where there is a condemnation of public property for a federal
project, it is possible that the ensuing benefits to the state or locality
may not fully offset the burdens created by the takings.8 2 Nevertheless,
ences when deciding which military installations to close).
"8 The Land Acquisition Section of the United States Department of Justice is
charged with the duty of coordinating the filing of condemnation actions for the United
States government. The Land Acquisition Section maintains computerized records of all
federal condemnations since 1980. A computer-generated list of all condemnations was
examined on June 6, 1988. Information contained on the list for each condemned
"tract" included the name of each condemnee, the federal district court in which each
condemnation action was filed, and the name of the project for which the condemnation
occurred. Because the amount of acreage contained in a "tract" varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, one cannot determine from this listing the amount of land condemned
for each project. See Interview with William Kollins and Brenda Rossi, Land Acquisition Section, Department of Justice (Washington, D.C. March 11, 1988); see also
Telephone interview with Brenda Rossi, Land Acquisition Section, Department of Justice (Washington, D.C. October 3, 1988) (same).
I classified a condemnation as intergovernmental if the condemnee was listed in
the records of the Land Acquisition Section as a state or locality. Of 1,570 projects for
which property was condemned since 1980, 146 projects, or 9% involved intergovernmental takings. See id.
• See Arnold, supra note 72, at 280.
80 Each year, members of Congress propose and enact programs of questionable
utility to straighten or elongate rivers, erect dams, and dredge waterways. See, e.g., J.
FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL PoLTrrics 51-53 (1974) (analyzing the "pork barrel politics"
that leads to enactment of river and harbor legislation).
" Examination of the computerized records from the Land Acquisition Section,
see supra note 78, reveals that 8 percent of federal condemnations of state and local
properties provided land for federal facilities serving local communities such as post
offices and hospitals; a similar proportion of condemnations amassed land for parks and
wildlife preserves. A significant share of intergovernmental condemnations, 20 percent,
were undertaken to appropriate land for military uses such as bases, proving grounds
and storage depots. The remaining projects for which public property was condemned
included roads, federal border facilities, air navigation monitoring posts, and the strategic petroleum reserve.
82 This result may occur as a result of intergovernmental takings that generate
predominantly general benefits. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. In addition,
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even in the instances where burdens are not completely offset by benefits, the actual burdens borne by intergovernmental condemnees are
likely to be much less than those borne by private condemnees. Therefore, if the compensation requirement contained in the fifth amendment
is justified on the ground of preventing unfair burdens, this justification, while possibly not irrelevant, is nonetheless much less persuasive
in explaining why public condemnees should be entitled to
compensation.8 3
B.

Minimizing Investment Risk

Paying compensation to condemnees has been justified on the
ground that it contributes to economic efficiency by minimizing the risk
of capital investment. Although this rationale may support a compensation requirement with respect to condemnations of private property, it
does not apply with equal force to intergovernmental takings. Even if
one were to assume that public entities invest efficiently in capital,
states and localities have opportunities to minimize the risk created by
uncompensated condemnations that are unavailable to most property
owners in the private sector.
1. Compensation, Risk Minimization, and the Private Condemnee
If no compensation requirement existed, the possibility that the
federal government might expropriate one's property would increase
the risk84 of capital investment. Risk and uncertainty are generally considered to be undesirable because they may lead to economic ineffilocal benefits may not offset burdens if intergovernmental takings were utilized by
groups of states to exploit other states. See infra notes 202-38 and accompanying text.
83 In addition to preventing overcompensation, eliminating compensation for public condemnees might have the salutary effect of reducing the number of inefficient
federal projects. Several commentators have noted the tendency of the federal government to sponsor "pork barrel" projects that generate substantial local benefits, but
whose costs exceed total benefits. See supra notes 79-80; cf. infra note 212 and accompanying text. One of the major reasons for the existence of pork barrel projects is that
members of Congress believe that sponsoring projects that generate significant localized
benefits, but whose costs are dispersed throughout the nation, will assist them in maintaining and expanding their electoral support. With respect to projects that generate
predominantly local benefits, eliminating compensation for takings of public property
would raise the costs to the communities deriving concentrated benefits, perhaps inducing their representatives in Congress to demand a more efficient mix of public projects.
But see infra text accompanying notes 114-19 (if compensation is not paid, fiscal illusion might lead to an inefficiently large number of projects).
' "Risk" may be defined as "the variation in the possible outcomes that exists in
a given situation." C. WILLIAMS & R. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 7
(3d ed. 1976). A person's conscious awareness of risk is sometimes called "uncertainty."
Id. at 8.
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ciency.8" A profit-maximizing individual's investment decisions are
likely to be efficient, provided that they are based upon an accurate
perception of the investment's expected value. 6 If an individual were
unaffected by the presence of risk, and had perfect information, her
perception of the value of an investment should equal its expected
value. Such a hypothetical person is said to be "risk neutral.18 7 Most

commentators, however, do not believe that the majority of people are
indifferent to risk; rather, the majority are said to be "risk averse".8
Therefore, risk, such as the possibility of an uncompensated taking by
the federal government, may lead to economic inefficiency if risk averse
investors avoid high risk activities with positive expected values, preferring safer, yet perhaps less productive investments.89
Compensation can be justified as a method for reducing the risk of
government action to an individual by spreading risk among all taxpayers. By reducing risk for the individual, compensation presumably promotes efficiency. 90 Thus, for example, an individual property owner,
85 See id. at 15.
86 To determine the expected value of an investment, one must multiply the possible yield from each aspect of the investment by the probability the yield will be received
and then add the resulting products. See A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW
AND ECONOMICS 27 (1983) ("the expected gain from a situation involving a 50 percent
chance of winning $10,000 is $5,000.").
87 A risk neutral person is indifferent to risk and cares only about the expected
value of a particular venture. See id. ("A risk-neutral person would, by definition, be
indifferent between [situations] with the same expected gain - such as a situation
involving a 25 percent chance of winning $20,000, or one involving certainty of winning $5,000.").
88 When faced with a choice between two investments which are expected to yield
similar expected values, a risk averse individual will usually invest in the one with
lower risk or alternatively, require a purchase price reduction to invest in the one with
higher risk. See Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation For Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 569, 585 (1984).
The proposition that most people are risk averse is illustrated by the fact that
many people buy liability insurance, and that most investors demand a greater return
on riskier investments. See Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REv. 511, 527 n.47 (1986). Such risk averse behavior can be explained as
resulting from the decreasing marginal utility of income: the greater the yield, the less
people value the extra income, whereas the greater the loss, the more value lost per
decrease in income. See id; see also C. WILLIAMS & R. HEINS, supra note 84, at 14
(providing a graphic illustration of this concept).
89 See Blume and Rubinfeld, supra note 88, at 590; Fischel & Shapiro, Takings,
Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretationsof 'just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269 (1988); Kaplow, supra note 88, at 527-29;
Knetsch & Borcherding, Expropriation of Private Property and the Basis For Compensation, 29 U. TORONTO L.J. 237, 243 (1979). As Knetsch and Borcherding suggest, "a failure to pay full compensation . .. may encourage risk-averse owners to
hedge against what to them are fortuitous expropriation events by under-investing in
improvements to their property." Id. Cf Michelman, supra note 43, at 1214-15 (discussing demoralization costs that would occur from uncompensated taking).
90 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 88, at 590-592; Fischel & Shapiro, supra
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guaranteed that her property interest will be compensated should the
government require it for its own purposes, would not be dissuaded
from investing in productive activities on account of the risk of government action.9"
In recent years, several economists and lawyers have argued that
the risk minimization rationale for compensation is overly simplistic
and that compensating condemnees might not necessarily further the
objective of efficiency. Their critique of compensation proceeds from the
premise that an efficient level of investment occurs only when investors
bear the costs of their decisions. The problem is that the government's
assurance that it will compensate property owners when it takes land
by eminent domain, eliminates, for the most part, the need for the investor to consider the risk of government action. Rather than leading to
an efficient level of capital investment, the assurance of compensation
may create an incentive for individuals to over-invest in property because they are not forced to internalize9 2 all of the expected costs of the
venture.9 3
note 89, at 269; Kaplow, supra note 88, at 528. Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro discuss
the argument that "[s]ince private insurance against the risk of a taking is not generally
available, compensation in the case of taking can increase efficiency in a world of riskaverse investors." Blume, Rubinfeld & Shapiro, The Taking Of Land: When Should
CompensationBe Paid? 99 Q.J. ECON. 71, 72 (1984). Nevertheless, each of the abovecited authors also critiques compensation for leading to other inefficiencies. See, e.g., id.
at 90 (discussing inefficiencies that result when parties are not required to internalize
all costs of a venture); Fischel & Shapiro, supra, at 271-77 (same); Kaplow, supra, at
529, 531 (same).
91 Madison's inclusion of the just compensation clause in the Bill of Rights may
also reflect concerns of economic efficiency. Madison viewed protection of property
rights as essential to productive investment. In an 1821 comment written on a draft of
his speech before the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Madison argued that "[iun
civilized communities, property as well as liberty is an essential object of the laws,
which encourage industry by securing the enjoyment of its fruits . . . ." Documentary
Histoy of the Constitution, in DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU
OF ROLLS AND LIBRARY,

No. 11, pt. 2, at 440, 441 (1905); see also M.

MEYERS, THE

OF THE FOUNDER 503 (1973) (quoting and analyzing Madison's 1821 comment concerning his address to the Consitutional Convention on August 7, 1787); see
also Rose, supra note 44, at 586-87 (Madison believed that uncertainty created by
redistributions of property would create turmoil for wealth-producing enterprise.).
92 An activity of one person which affects the welfare of another in a way that is
outside the market is called an externality. See H. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 53 (2d ed.
1988). A person who is forced to take account of an externality is said to "internalize"
the externality. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 88, at 540 ("the insurance premium
internalizes this externality").
A basic principle of welfare economics is that markets may fail to allocate resources efficiently if individuals who create costs or benefits are not held accountable by
the market for those costs or benefits. See H. ROSEN, supra, at 52 (discussing externalities as one of the standard causes of market failure). In the case of compensated takings, the risk from government action is external to the property owner and spread
throughout the taxpaying public. See supra text accompanying note 90.
" See R. CooTER & T. ULEN, supra note 19, at 200; Blume, Rubinfeld and
MIND
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In a recent article, Kaplow suggests that the optimal balance between risk and incentives might be reached by private market alternatives to government compensation, such as diversification and insurance. 4 Diversification typically involves investing in a number of
unrelated assets, in effect reducing the magnitude of loss from an uncertain event. 5 If a person with a diversified portfolio of investments
were to suffer a condemnation, only a small proportion of her total
wealth would likely be affected. Unfortunately for most property owners, diversification is impractical because they lack sufficient wealth to
96
invest in the number of assets required for proper risk reduction.
Insurance, on the other hand, is a widely used risk minimization
strategy.9 7 Kaplow argues that insurance can serve the same risk minimization function as government compensation."' Moreover, because
the insurance premium includes a payment equal to the expected loss
from condemnation, insurance would force property owners to internalize the costs associated with potential government condemnations,
Shapiro, supra note 90, at 90; Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 89, at 277; Kaplow,
supra note 88, at 529, 531.
84 See Kaplow, supra note 88, at 527-42.
g See J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 50 (4th ed. 1977)
(Risk exposure is reduced to the degree that assets exhibit less than a perfect positive
correlation among their expected earnings.). To the extent that unrelated assets have a
small probability of a perfect positive correlation, such a diversification reduces risk.
See id. A property owner might diversify his or her risk of condemnation by investing
in different types of property (e.g. tangible and intangible) or in similar types of
properties that are geographically dispersed.
98 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 88, at 591-92 ("When a homeowner
purchases a parcel of land, the investment in the land and structure often represents a
substantial portion of that individual's net worth.").
9" See Kaplow, supra note 88, at 527-28. Insurance is a device which entails pooling the risks of two or more persons. Each insured party contributes to a fund out of
which losses are indemnified. See C. WILLIAMS & R. HEINS, supra note 84, at 200. In
essence, the insured party exchanges the risk of loss in the future for a certain present
cost, typically in the form of an insurance premium. R. POSNER, supra note 19, at 91.
In most instances, an insurance premium will exceed the expected loss of the casualty.
It will include charges to cover the insurer's expenses and profit. See C. WILLIAMS &
R. HEINS, supra, at 492. In addition, it will usually be based upon the average
probability of loss rather than individual probabilities. See R. POSNER, supra, at 91-92;
Kaplow, supra note 88, at 543 (Insurance companies approximate individual premiums by "averaging risk factors over groups that cannot be more precisely differentiated
without significant cost.").
"8 Compensation functions like insurance in many ways with respect to risk-bearing. The risk to the individual property owner of a condemnation is spread throughout
the taxpaying public. See supra text accompanying note 90. A major difference between compensation and insurance is that for compensation, there is no necessary correlation between the amount of taxes paid by a citizen and the expected loss to that
citizen from condemnation. With regard to insurance, however, the insured's premium
includes a payment which is approximately equal to the expected loss from the event
insured against.
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thereby safeguarding against over-investment."9
Although private sector alternatives to compensation may seem attractive on efficiency grounds, certain practical constraints may limit
their utility. If the government were not required to pay compensation
when it condemned property, it is not certain that the private sector
would step into the void and provide insurance because of the problems
posed by adverse selection and moral hazard.
The problem of adverse selection could be a major impediment to
establishing a market in private condemnation insurance.10 0 Condemnations are by their nature localized events, frequently made necessary
by community or regional needs."0 ' In many instances, property owners
may be in a better position to evaluate the probability that the government will require their property than employees of insurance companies, who are likely to have little familiarity with all of the localities in
which their insurance companies operate. 10 2 Because of the voluntary,
self-selective character of insurance purchases, a disproportionate share
of policies is likely to be issued to higher-risk individuals, resulting in a
higher probability of insurance losses than the data concerning the likelihood of condemnation would predict. Eventually, excess losses and inadequate data could lead to the withdrawal of insurance companies
o See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
100 If the insured are better able to predict their probability of loss than the insurance provider, the premiums charged might not adequately cover the expected losses
due to condemnation. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 88, at 595-97; Fischel &
Shapiro, supra note 89, at 286; Palmer, Property, Compensation and Risk (Book Review), 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 163, 169 (1984). But see Kaplow, supra note 88, at
545 (suggesting that mandatory insurance might solve this problem of adverse selection
"by preventing low-risk individuals from dropping their coverage.").
101 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "local"
nature of many federal projects requiring condemnations.
102 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 88, at 595 ("insurers are not always as
accurate as policyholders in assessing the probabilities of the event they are insuring").
But cf. id. at 597 n.84 ("these problems can be diminished to the extent that insurance
companies can rely on specialists to develop expertise about local markets").
In addition, takings are typically the result of a political process that frequently
involves lengthy discussion and debate. Cf Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How
Just Is just Compensation?,48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 767 & n. 11 (1973) (eminent domain consumes much time). It is quite possible that a property owner, being
concerned with only a limited number of properties and having an intense interest in
those properties, would have a greater incentive and ability to learn about how proposed government actions would affect her properties than would a provider of insurance. Some commentators have attributed the current absence of private insurance for
costs typically uncompensated in eminent domain proceedings, such as goodwill and
relocation expenses, to the problem of adverse selection. See Fischel & Shapiro, supra
note 89, at 286 (discussing letter from Ellickson). In addition, no market exists to insure owners from the adverse effects of zoning decisions, even though the losses associated with rezoning can be large and are rarely compensated. See Blume & Rubinfeld,
supra note 88, at 597 (a "market simply does not exist . . . for insurance against
future land price changes resulting from government activity").
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from the market.
Another impediment to development of a market for private condemnation insurance is the problem of moral hazard."0 3 If a property
owner does not bear any of the costs of the condemnation, she might
not pressure the government to avoid a taking. Indeed, under certain
circumstances property owners might actually encourage the government to condemn their property so as to collect insurance proceeds.1 'O
Adverse selection and moral hazard render effective private sector alternatives to compensation infeasible, and perhaps, undesirable.10 5 Consequently, market alternatives to government compensation, such as condemnation insurance, are unlikely to lead to an efficient level of capital
investment by risk averse individuals.
103 A "moral hazard" is a situation in which an insured person or entity might
take some action to actually cause a loss or fail to take some action within its power to
avoid a loss. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 88, at 593 ("Moral hazard occurs
when the party to be insured can affect the probability ... of the event that triggers
payment.").
104 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 88, at 594 ("investors who believe that
insurance payments will overcompensate them might lobby" for the event insured
against). But see Kaplow, supra note 88, at 537-41 (arguing that co-insurance can
alleviate the problem of moral hazard). Even if a market were to develop to provide
insurance for condemnations, compensation might still be required for those who underestimate the risk of a condemnation. See Kaplow, supra note 88, at 548. Because a
condemnation is an event that has a low probability of occurring, many property owners might not accurately perceive the risk of a taking and, therefore, fail to purchase
insurance. As a result, the low probability of condemnations might result in insufficient
risk spreading for some property owners. Furthermore, the absence of compensation
might have negative distributional consequences since it is likely that compared to property owners who accurately estimate the risk of government condemnations, those who
underestimate that risk are less sophisticated and have fewer resources to monitor public decision-making. See id. at 549. Because a property owner who underestimates the
risk of condemnation is already likely to over-invest in property, compensation would
be unlikely to distort further her investment choices and might remedy unfair distributional consequences. But ef. id. at 549-50 (arguing that compulsory insurance would be
more desirable than compensation to deal with problem of underestimation of risk).
105 Private insurance might be more costly to administer than the current system
of compensation. Under the existing system, administrative costs are not expended until
the government takes property. At that point, the property must be appraised and its
value set either by consensual agreement or by litigation. Under a system of private
insurance, however, all insured parties must transact with insurance companies regardless of whether their property is actually condemned. Properties must be appraised and
risks must be evaluated by employees of the insurance companies. Typically, these administrative costs are passed along to the purchasers in the form of higher insurance
premiums. If the transaction and administrative costs are large relative to the risk of
loss due to condemnation, insurance may not be cost-effective. See generally Kaplow,
supra note 88, at 545-548 (discussing the relative costs and benefits of insurance and
compensation).
An additional cost of abandoning the compensation requirement would be increased inefficiencies in government decision making due to the problem of fiscal illusion. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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2. Risk Minimization and Intergovernmental Takings
Even if government compensation can enhance the efficiency of
private capital investment (by spreading the risk of government takings
to all taxpayers), the risk minimization justification is considerably less
persuasive as a rationale for compensating public property owners such
as localities and states. When the condemnee is a public, rather than a
private entity, the assumptions underlying the risk minimization rationale for compensation become somewhat questionable.10 6 First, there is
considerable doubt as to whether states and localities behave in the
same manner as the idealized, utility-maximizing individual. If, as the
recent literature concerning political economy indicates, public entities
do not maximize benefits and minimize costs, 10 7 their investment deci-

sions - even disregarding the possible impact of uncompensated takings -are likely to be inefficient. Therefore, there is little reason to
believe that minimizing the risk of government action will lead to efficient decision making.
Second, there is some literature that casts doubt on the assumption
106 As discussed above, the risk minimization rationale for compensating private
condemnees is based on the assumption that individuals are rational actors who seek to
maximize the expected value of their investments. Because people are generally thought
to be risk averse, the possibility of an uncompensated taking distorts the investors' perception of expected values, leading to allocative inefficiency. Compensation promotes
efficient investments by spreading risk so that it is minimized for the individual investor. See supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
10 Several commentators have suggested that elected officials and bureaucrats do
not behave in an efficient fashion. These commentators suggest that rather than providing required public goods and services at least cost, legislators use allocative policy
making to further their own reelection goals, and administrative officials seek to enlarge
the size and importance of their bureaus. See generally R. ARNOLD, supra note 77, at
28-35 (arguing that representatives utilize allocation strategies designed to induce positive evaluations in their electoral districts); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT 119-262 (1962) (maintaining that government allocations of
goods and services are not guided solely by maximizing benefits and minimizing costs);
J. FEREJOHN, supra note 80, at 46 (offering a general indictment of the government's
mishandling of public works projects, including overestimation of benefits and underes-

timation of costs); G. HOUSEMAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE NEW BATTLEGROUND 102-08 (1986) (examining state government inefficiency); G. MILLER,
CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 72 (1980)
(discussing incentives for city council members and city managers to support "particularistic services" and large budgets); W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36-42 (1973) (stating that bureaucrats are people who are not
entirely motivated to maximize the general welfare - they frequently allocate goods
according to personal interest); M. SHEFTER, POLITICAL CRISIS/FISCAL CRISIS: THE

OF NEW YORK CITY 105-24 (1985) (discussing the political
sources of New York City's fiscal crisis); Orzechowski, Economic Models of Bureaucracy: Survey, Extensions and Evidence, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE
SOURCES
OF
GOVERNMENT
GROWTH
229, 230 (T. Borcherding ed.
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL

1977)("[B]ureaucrats maximize utility by producing outputs above minimum costs.").
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that public officials are risk averse.1 0 8 As we have seen, the objective in
adopting a compensation rule for private condemnees is to minimize the
inefficiencies introduced when investment decisions are made by riskaverse individuals. In keeping with the evidence that risk is not as salient for public decision-makers as for private investors, there is less reason to expect that minimizing the risk of intrusive federal action would
promote economic efficiency." 9
Even if one were willing to extend the behavioral assumptions of
utility maximization and risk aversion to public entities, the risk minimization justification remains a less compelling basis for compensating
states and localities. Unlike most private persons," 0 public entities typically own a considerable amount of property throughout the community
or state,"' and therefore, are in a better position to diversify against the
risk of an uncompensated taking. Generally, states and localities are2
also better situated than private property owners to self-insure"
Arrow & Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 366 (1970) (maintaining that the total cost of riskbearing is insignificant for public entities); Sikorsky, Public Enterprise(PE):How Is It
Different From the PrivateSector, 57 ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 477, 505
(1986) (noting that public enterprise may have more tolerance for risk). But cf. RoseAckerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation? 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980) ("Although insecure incumbents may gain from sponsoring risky projects, secure incumbents are likely to behave as if they were 'risk
averse'. .. ").
"09 Furthermore, even if one were to assume that government officials were risk
averse, a compensation rule could hinder rather than promote efficiency. Several commentators have observed that public entities systematically underestimate the costs of
their activities. See infra note 116. This tends to lead governments to overproduce goods
and services. If public entities were risk averse, however, the risk of an uncompensated
taking would result in less public output than would be justified by the expected loss
attributable to the risk. Cf supra text accompanying notes 85-89 (discussing the investment consequences of risk aversion in private actors). Therefore, it is possible that the
absence of compensation would increase efficiency as the government's "natural" tendency to overproduce goods and services is offset by the tendency to underproduce attributable to the risk of condemnation.
11 According to a 1978 survey of landowners conducted by the United States Department of Agriculture, the typical landowner in the United States is a 50-year-old,
white male with a high school education who lives on his own land; the average private
landholding is forty acres. See G. GUSTAFSON, WHO OWNS THE LAND? A STATE AND
REGIONAL SUMMARY OF LANDOWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES iv (1982). Nine
tenths of all private landowners are individuals whose landholdings "tend to be small
compared with the holdings of others." Id. at 16.
"Il According to a 1982 inventory of land use in the United States, states and
localities own approximately 155 million acres of land. See H. FREY & R. HEXEM,
MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE UNITED STATES: 1982 14 (1985). A recent census
reveals that there are 82,340 state and local governmental units in the United States.
See 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982 CENSUS OF GovERNMENTS vi (1982).
112 Self-insurance is a risk retention mechanism in which a private firm or government body plans to pay the losses it incurs from its own funds. See C. WILLIAMS &
108 See
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against the risk of a condemnation. They typically have both greater
assets and greater expertise in assessing risk. Many states and localities
also have significant experience with self-insurance programs. Groups
of localities or states frequently pool funds in an effort to obtain the
benefits of both self-insurance and risk spreading." 3
C.

Avoiding Fiscal Illusion

In addition to making the decisions of potential condemnees more
efficient by minimizing investment risk, compensation also has been
justified as contributing to efficient decision-making by condemnors. If
it were not required to pay for property it took by eminent domain, the
federal government might substitute condemned property for other inputs that might be less valuable to society."' This government utilization of more valuable resources in the place of less valuable ones is a
form of "fiscal illusion."" 5 Because fiscal illusion interferes with resources finding their most valued use in the market, fiscal illusion creates allocative inefficiency. Hence, one function of a compensation requirement would be to eliminate the illusion, forcing the government to
bear the real costs of its actions." 6
R. HEINS, supra note 84, at 190. Self-insurance is typically used by firms or entities
that: 1) are large enough to assume risk, 2) can reasonably predict future losses, and 3)
can benefit from obtaining control over their losses by improving claim processing, and
saving the loading charges that would be paid to an outside insurer. See Young, SelfInsurance in RISK MANAGEMENT TODAY: A HOW-TO GUIDE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT 59-61 (N. Wasserman & D. Phelus, eds. 1985).
"I During the early 1980's, many localities and states were unable to purchase
insurance from private companies. See COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
STUDY COMMISSION, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY INSURANCE: A CRISIS 9-13 (May 1986). Many public entities inaugurated or enhanced

self-insurance programs and pooled funds. See Myers, Managing Municipal Liability
Risk, GOVERNANCE 18 (Summer-Fall 1987).
114

See R.

POSNER,

supra note 19, at § 3.6.

"" "Fiscal illusion" traditionally refers to the methods utilized by governments to

disguise the level of taxation in order to minimize taxpayer resistance. See R.
BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 131 (1967). In describing the
writings of Amilcare Puviani, an Italian political scientist, Buchanan states that "[t]he
ruling group attempts, to the extent that is possible, to create fiscal illusions, and these
have the effect of making taxpayers think that the taxes to which they are subjected are
less burdensome than they actually are." Id. Among the fiscal illusions suggested by
Puviani are obscuring the real cost of public goods, timing the payment of taxes to
coincide with favorable events, fragmenting the total tax burden among several taxes,
and adopting taxes with uncertain incidence. According to Buchanan, certain modern
taxes and tax practices exemplify elements of fiscal illusion, including tax withholding,
social security taxes, and corporate income taxes. Id. at 139-41.
116 Justifying compensation as necessary to prevent fiscal illusion requires the acceptance of two assumptions: 1) Policy makers and bureaucrats fail to take into account
social costs that are not translated into budgetary outflows, and 2) Government officials
do not similarly discount the benefits generated by government programs. See Kaplow,
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Prevention of fiscal illusion justifies compensation for public condemnees as well as private condemnees. Although a state is presumably
better situated than a private individual to make the cost of a taking
apparent to federal policy makers, 117 there is no assurance that the government will properly take that cost into account unless it is forced to
pay for the value of the property condemned."' In addition, if only
takings of private property were compensated, the problem posed by
fiscal illusion would be magnified. For many projects, publicly owned
property could be readily substituted for private property. If the federal
supra note 88, at 567-68. If government officials discounted benefits by the same
amount that they discounted costs, no illusion would occur - the "net" benefit of the
program would be the same as if no discounting took place. See id. at 568.
The available evidence supports the validity of these two assumptions. Notwithstanding political economists' models of representative government indicating that small
groups of intensely interested citizens can have a disproportionate influence on legislation, see M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 145-46 (1965) (explaining
the surprising power of business lobbies), it would be extremely difficult for any one
individual or entity to have sufficient power to force the government to account for the
cost of condemned property. Moreover, given the isolated nature of condemnations,
groups of condemnees would likely find the cost of organization to be prohibitive. In
addition, several empirical studies indicate that governments overestimate benefits and
underestimate costs generated by public programs. See, e.g., J. FEREJOHN, supra note
80, at 20 (finding that the Army Corps of Engineers overestimates benefits and underestimates costs); G. DOWNS & P. LARKEY, supra note 22, at 125-127 (citing examples

of cost underestimation and benefit overestimation); R.

HAVEMAN, THE ECONOMIC

93-109 (1972) (concluding that the Army
Corps of Engineers estimates have historically been lower than the realized costs of
projects).
..
7 It is important to note that fiscal illusion can occur at two levels - in Congress, and in the federal bureaucracy. States are more likely than private individuals to
be influential at both of these levels. Many states have hired professional staffs to lobby
members of Congress. See D. HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS COME TO WASHINGTON: GOVERNORS, MAYORS, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING 1-45 (1974)
(describing national lobbying organizations of mayors and governors); Beer, Federalism, Nationalism and Democracy in America, 72 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 9, 18-19 (1978)
(discussing intergovernmental lobby); Conlan, Federalism and American Politics: New
PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC INVESTMENTS

Relationships, a Changing System, 11

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PERSP. 32, 43 (Winter

1985) (noting that individual states and cities have established lobbying organizations
in Washington, D.C.).
Such lobbying can be doubly effective because legislators frequently have significant influence over administrative agencies by virtue of their committee assignments.
See generally, R. ARNOLD, supra note 77, at 107-15 (discussing committee members'
influence over the actions of agencies). Even if an individual Member of Congress did
not have direct influence over an agency threatening to condemn property in her district, she might be able to logroll with another who did. See id. at 49. If the object of
the taking were to exploit or harm the state in which the condemned property was
located, however, logrolling would likely be ineffective. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
"' But cf. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 88, at 621 (observing that full indemnification may overcompensate condemnee if the government is subject only to partial
fiscal illusion); Quinn & Trebilcock, Compensation, Transition Costs And Regulatory
Change, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 135 (1982) (suggesting that compensation might
not protect against allocative inefficiency due to manipulation of benefits).
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government were required to compensate only private condemnees, officials might find it hard to resist taking state and local property, even if
private property were better suited for the project." 9
D.

Protection From Political Exploitation

In addition to promoting fair distribution of the costs of government, minimizing investment risk, and preventing fiscal illusion, the
just compensation clause serves a vital role in policing the political process. If the federal government were able to take private property without compensation, two types of abuse might occur. First, if groups of
citizens, or factions, gained control of the legislative process, they might
use uncompensated takings as an instrument for enriching themselves
at the expense of other, less politically powerful citizens. Requiring the
federal government to compensate property owners when it takes their
property reduces the incentives for this type of "rent-seeking,"1 2 by
spreading the costs of such behavior to all citizens, including those in
power. Second, if the federal government were not required to compensate condemnees, those in power could use the power of eminent domain to punish or coerce specific citizens, thereby depriving them of
their liberty. 21 The compensation requirement limits the ability of
those in control of the federal government to use the power of eminent
domain to deprive citizens of their liberty by indemnifying citizens, that
is, requiring the government to ensure that the condemnees are in as
good a position as they were prior to the government action.
This rationale for compensation also applies to intergovernmental
takings, because states and localities, themselves, may be the objects of
Under some conditions, however, a compensation requirement for intergovernmental takings might hinder rather than promote economic efficiency. See supra note
109 (discussing the possible increase in efficiency that may result from states and local
governments bearing some share of the cost of federal programs).
1I0 In this context, "[r]ent-seeking refers to an attempt to obtain economic rents
... through government intervention in the market." Macey, Promoting Public-Re119

garding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 223, 224 n.6 (1986). Economic rents are payments for the use of an
asset which are greater than what the asset would command in any alternative use. See
R. TOLLISON & G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENTSEEKING SOCIETY 3 (1980) [hereinafter RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY]; Merrill, Rent Seek-

J. BUCHANAN,

ing, supra note 45, at 1586.
21 See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 771-74 (1964) (function of
property is to create a zone of privacy and independence that promotes individual free-

dom). But see Baker, Property and its Relation to ConstitutionallyProtected Liberty,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 775-82 (1986) (contrasting "formal" and "substantive" con-

ceptions of liberty); Nedelsky, American Constitutionalismand the Paradoxof Private
Property, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241, 241 (J. Elster & R. Slagstad eds. 1988) ("[P]rivate property no longer serves as a boundary between individual
rights and governmental power.").
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rent-seeking and factional abuse. Thus, compensation for intergovernmental takings can be justified as serving a political function analogous
to compensation for private property owners. Requiring the federal
government to pay for the property it expropriates raises the cost of
rent-seeking behavior to the citizens of states in control of the legislative
process, thereby limiting the disruption to the condemnee, and reducing
the potential advantages to the rent-seeking states. Provided that intergovernmental condemnees receive full indemnification for their property, the ability of state factions to use the federal power of eminent
domain for the purpose of disrupting or coercing other states would be
limited. Like the preceding analyses of the other three justifications for
compensation, I begin this section with a discussion of private condemnees and the way that compensation has been justified as a necessary protection against factional abuse. As an essential foundation for
presenting the analogous rationale for intergovernmental takings, I present a normative argument to support the proposition that states and
localities have an important, if at times problematic, role to play in the
operation of our political system. On balance, the principles of federalism which preserve the integrity and independent decision-making authority of states are defensible on grounds of political theory and economic efficiency. Courts need not rely on strained analogies to private
individuals in justifying compensation for intergovernmental condemnees. Instead, compensation for state and local condemnees may be
justified as necessary to preserve the integrity and independence of
states and localities in our federal system.
1. Private Takings, Just Compensation, and the Evils of Faction
Earlier in this Article, the just compensation requirement was
shown to have been designed, in part, to prevent unfair burdens from
falling on private property owners.1" Without a compensation requirement, some citizens might find themselves paying more than their fair
share for public goods and services. In protecting against unfair burdens, the just compensation requirement, together with other constitutional provisions, serves a vital political function. Requiring the federal
government to compensate citizens when it takes their property limits
the opportunity for individuals to use the coercive power of the government for their own ends. Even the most cursory reading of historical
sources reveals that the architects of our system of government were
extremely concerned with the potential for one group of citizens to take
122

See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
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over the machinery of government and use it for their own advantage. 23 To guard against factional abuse, 2 the Framers constructed a
system of government with structural safeguards against concentrations
1 25

of power.

The Bill of Rights also contains a "shield of rights" 2 designed to
protect citizens from incursions on liberty.' 27 Among the elements of
this shield of rights is the just compensation clause. 2 8 There can be no
doubt that among the Framers' principal concerns was the protection of
private property. 1 29 In addition to the contract' 30 and due process''
122 For example, Madison writes that an essential problem of governance is how
to control the problems posed by factions, which he defines as "a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38-40 (1985) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Interest Groups] (noting that the federalists justified a federal system, in part,
as suited to controlling factions) .
124 As Madison's statement of the problem indicates, see supra note 123, the
Framers seem to have focused on the danger, or potential for abuse by groups of likeminded individuals. Contemporary scholars are divided as to the scope and seriousness
of what is today called the "special interest group" problem. See Fitts, The Vices of

Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1567, 1582 n.36 (1988) (comparing divergent contemporary
analyses of special interest groups).
"I The Constitution sets up a system of government in which there are many
checks and balances designed to prevent factions from gaining power. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the three branches of the national government divide
power horizontally. See L. FREEDMAN, POWER AND POLiTICS IN AMERICA 9-10 (2d
ed. 1974); Beer, supra note 117, at 12-13. "Vertical" checks and balances also exist
between the states and the national government. See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra
note 123, at 44.
128 See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 123, at 33 (describing the shield as
creating "spheres of individual autonomy into which the government may not enter").
127 Some commentators have suggested that the system of government devised by
the Framers also ircludes elements to promote civic virtue which would have the effect
of countering tendencies toward faction. See id. at 32-33.
228 See id. at 33 ("This shield of autonomy could protect.
. . rights of traditional
private property . . ").
129 See, e.g., THE FEDERALmT No. 54, at 339 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) ("Government is instituted no less for the protection of property than of the
persons of individuals."); DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES (C. Tansill ed. 1927) 161-62 (quoting Madison's
assertion that national government is necessary to provide security for property rights);

Nedelsky, "Economic Liberties" and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism:
The FederalistPerspective, in To SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITImON 221 (S. Thurow ed. 1988) (stating that protecting
property was a central concern of Framers); Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 713-14 (1938) (discussing the close relation between liberty and property for the Framers); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note
123, at 44 (protection of private property was a principal interest of Framers). Many
adherents of republican thought recognized the importance of property in permitting
citizens to avoid subordination to others and in permitting citizens to develop civic vir-
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clauses, the just compensation clause is the principal protection of private property in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. The compensation
requirement reduces the incentive for a faction to gain political power
for the purpose of appropriating property for its own benefit.1" 2 Perhaps even more important to the Framers, the just compensation clause
also protects citizens from tyranny. Without a compensation requirement, factions that gained control of the federal government could deprive other citizens of their liberty by threatening to take their property
if they did not submit to the will of those in power.1"'
Madison's intention that the just compensation clause prevent factional abuse and protect individual liberty can be seen from contemporaneous history and Madison's own writings. In the years following the
Revolutionary War, several states had passed laws that had the effect of
benefiting debtors at the expense of creditors.' In addition, state legislatures enacted laws punishing citizens who had supported the crown
by confiscating their property without compensation.1 35 These actions,
no doubt, influenced Madison, who wrote just after the ratification of
the fifth amendment that a government which violated the rights of
tue. See Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right To Property in Revolutionary America,
19 J. LAW & ECON. 467, 474 (1976) (discussing Jefferson's belief that private property permits citizens to avoid subordination and cultivate inner strength).
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
131 U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV § 1.
'3
See Merrill, Rent Seeking, supra note 45, at 1577 (characterizing Epstein's
view of the just compensation clause). Cf Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 123, at
45 (constitutional safeguards against faction were designed principally to protect property rights). In addition to the compensation requirement, the public use requirement
of the just compensation clause protects against exercises of eminent domain designed to
benefit individual private interests. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 169-70; Merrill,
Rent Seeking, supra note 45, at 1578; Stoebuck, A General Theory, supra note 12, at
589; Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1724 (1984). But see Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)
(reducing the impact of public use test by holding that the power of eminent domain is
coterminus with the police power).
.3 See Sax, supra note 44, at 57-60, 64-65 (1964) (arguing that the purpose of
the just compensation clause is to protect citizens from arbitrary and oppressive government action, not merely to maintain property values). See also Tushnet, Federalism
and the Traditions of American PoliticalTheory, 19 GA. L. REV. 981, 985-86 (1985)
(under liberalism, property contributes to liberty by preventing domination by others
and promoting domestic tranquility).
13
For example, several states enacted legislation suspending debts and took actions to devalue money. See A. KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BELz, THE AMERICAN

(6th ed. 1983); A. NEVINS, THE
AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION 569-72 (1924); G. WOOD,
supra note 50, at 404-06; E. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763-1789
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 88

127-28 (1956).
135 All states with the exception of South Carolina passed laws confiscating loyalist estates without compensation. See A. NEVINS, supra note 134, at 507; Note, Origins
and Significance, supra note 12, at 698.
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property "is not a pattern for the United States."' 3 6 Madison made the
connection between the protection of property and the prevention of
tyranny explicit in the same essay: "Where an excess of power prevails,
property of no sort is duly respected. No man is safe in his opinions,
1 37
his person, his faculties, or his possessions."'
Courts and commentators have also espoused the view that the
purpose of the just compensation clause goes beyond preventing unfair
or unequal burdens to protecting the political system from factional
abuse. In Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago,"8" the Supreme Court
held that states were bound by the just compensation clause. In discussing why just compensation was an element of due process under the
fourteenth amendment, Justice Harlan paraphrased language from
Loan Association v. Topeka"3 9 stating that "a government by whatever
name it was called, under which the property of citizens was at the
absolute disposition and unlimited control of any depository of power,
was, after all, but a despotism. . . ."
Similarly, in his Commentaries
on the Constitution, Justice Story observes, "in a free government almost all other rights would become utterly worthless if the government
possessed an uncontrollable power over the private fortune of every
citizen." '
2.

Intergovernmental Takings, Faction, and Federalism

Just as uncompensated takings would make private citizens vulnerable to abuse by factions that engaged in rent-seeking and curtailment of liberty, the absence of compensation for intergovernmental takings would make states and municipalities vulnerable to similar evils.
Groups of states could band together in Congress to enact policies and
programs that would benefit themselves by expropriating property belonging to other states. These expropriations could disrupt the ability of
states to continue providing the services expected by their citizens. In
131 See Property, supra note 54, at 267-68.
137 Id. at 266.
18 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897).
139 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874). In Loan Association v. Topeka, the Supreme
Court invalidated a state statute which authorized towns to issue bonds in support of
private industry. According to the Court, the use of the power of taxation to support
interest payments on the debt was not a public purpose. Id. at 665.
o Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 166 U.S. at 237.
141 2
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrruTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1790, at 570 (5th ed. 1891); see also, R. EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 138
(noting that protection of private property fosters freedom of speech and the protection
of liberty by preventing factions from seizing power); Philbrick, supra note 129, at 713
(discussing government's role as a protector of private property); Sax, supra note 44, at
54-60 (discussing the Framers' concern with tyrannical power).
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addition, uncompensated takings could be used by groups of states to
accomplish objectives more sinister than mere rent-seeking. Intergovernmental takings could be used systematically by those in control of
the national government to disadvantage individual states, groups of
states, or regions, by impoverishing them and disrupting their operations. Uncompensated intergovernmental takings, therefore, would constitute a threat to the values of federalism upon which the political system of the United States is based.
a.

The Case For Federalism

A compensation requirement for intergovernmental takings predicated upon protecting federalism is compelling only if the values served
by federalism are important, and are best promoted by a federal system.
American federalism has been both controversial and, enigmatic since its
inception in the eighteenth century.142 Perhaps as good a definition of
federalism as any is offered by William Riker: "The essential institutions of federalism are, of course, a government of the federation and a
set of governments of the member units, in which both kinds of governments rule over the same territory and people and each kind has the
authority to make some decisions independently of the other."' 4" Four
qualities are often identified as the essential virtues justifying a federal
system: preserving individual liberty, promoting citizen participation,
providing laboratories for political experimentation, and efficiently providing public goods.
(i) Preservation of Individual Liberty
Independent decision-making authority, the core of Riker's definition of federalism, is central to the oldest and most important justification for a federal system - the preservation of individual liberty. The
existence of significant independent decision-making authority at the
142 In fact, it is somewhat ironic that Madison, Hamilton, and Jay came to be
known as "Federalists." At the Constitutional Convention, Madison, along with the
other members of his state's delegation, proposed the Virginia Plan, which gave Congress the power to "negative all laws passed by the several states, contravening in the
opinion of the National Legislature the articles of the Union." Although the Virginia
Plan was not adopted by the Convention, it illustrated Madison's sympathy for a strong
national government, rather than a mere federation of states. See A. KELLY, W.
HARBISON & H. BELZ, supra note 134, at 91-95; G. WOOD, supra note 50, at 525;
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 n.9 (1987).
I4 W. RIKER, FEDERALISM 5 (1964). Even today, the definition is not a settled
one. See Nathan, The Role of the States in American Federalism, in POLITICS AND
PUBIC POLICY 23-25 (G. Van Horne ed. forthcoming 1988 from Congressional Quarterly Publishers).
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state level was designed to protect individual liberty. If the national
government were to be captured by an authoritarian faction, the people
could look to the states to rise up against the threat to liberty; in fact,
the mere existence of independent state power would discourage
despotism.

14 4

A second form of oppression would also be checked by independent state power - the ability of groups of states to coalesce and gain
control of the machinery of government for the purpose of exploiting
citizens from other states or regions. Although life under the Articles of
Confederation had demonstrated that insufficient national power led
states to engage in disastrous economic warfare,14 5 many delegates to
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and the state ratifying conventions feared that too much national power might threaten citizens by
144 According to Hamilton:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government
will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can
make use of the other as the instrument of redress.
No. 28, at 181 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also THE
51, at 323 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (the national and
state governments "will control each other"); Beer, supra note 117, at 14; Diamond,
The Federalist'sView of Federalism, in INSTITUTE FOR STUDIES IN FEDERALISM, EsTHE FEDERALIST
FEDERALIST No.

SAYS IN FEDERALISM

21, 53-54 (1961) (noting the Federalists' view that in a system of

rival governments, if either the national or state government begins to usurp power, the
other will be able to rally the people against it); Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 81, 100 (stating
that the efficiency and responsiveness of state and local governments would enable them
to act as a "counterpoise" to national authority).
Theoretically, state and local officials would gain the allegiance of their constituents by appealing to local sentiments. Moreover, they would have had the opportunity
to develop competence and demonstrate their abilities at governance while serving their
states and localities. See Benson, Values of Decentralized Government, in ESSAYS IN
FEDERALISM, supra, at 1, 10; Macmahon, The Problems of Federalism:A Survey, in
FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 11 (A. Macmahon ed. 1955). Furthermore,
states and localities are particularly well suited to organize popular resistance to a tyrannical national government by virtue of their independent authority to require citizens to contribute to the opposition. See, e.g., Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof FederalismAfter Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 341, 388-89
(states can break national government's monopoly on coercion).
History, however, has shown that the existence of a federal form of government

may be insufficient to prevent national tyranny. See A. BRECHT, FEDERALISM AND
REGIONALISM IN GERMANY 7, 21-22, 118-19 (1945) (opposition of Prussia insufficient
to prevent Nazi takeover of German government and abolition of state authority).
States may also be more likely than the national government to deprive citizens, especially minorities, of their rights. See W. RIKER, supra note 143, at 142-45; Rapaczynski, supra, at 385-86 (homogeneity and cohesiveness of state populations increase likelihood of state oppression of minorities).
"I See A. KELLY , W. HARBISON & H. BELZ, supra note 134, at 87.
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establishing a vehicle for regional domination.14 Creating a strong national government, yet at the same time permitting states to remain as
independent political units with substantive power, helped to resolve
this dilemma.14 7
(ii) Promotion of Citizen Participation
In addition to protecting citizens from national oppression, a significant role for states enhances the legitimacy of government institutions and may promote their effectiveness. A representative democracy
such as the United States depends upon the participation of well-informed citizens. Many political commentators believe that meaningful
participation is fostered by decentralized, rather than centralized, governments. x4 Compared to centralized political systems, decentralized
148 One of the major arguments against the Constitution was that centralized
power would permit particular states or sections to gain control and drain wealth from
citizens of other states by discriminatory taxation and commercial legislation. See P.

ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES

1775-1787, at 186-94 (1983) (discussing Antifederalist objections to the Constitution); see also 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 615 (J. Elliot ed. 1901)
(Report of a speech by Rep. Grayson at Virginia Convention: "[tihe little states gain in
proportion as we lose . . . ."); I THE RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 341 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter M. FARRAND] (Madison, summarizing a speech by Delegate Luther Martin (Maryland): The American people
formed the federal government "to defend the lesser States agst. [sic] the ambition of the
larger. . . ."); id. at 167 (Madison summarizing speech by Delegate Gunning Bedford, Jr. (Delaware): The "large states [will] crush the small ones whenever they stand
in the way of their ambitions or interested views.").
Concerns about large states, primarily in the South, dominating smaller states,
primarily in the North, eventually produced what later became known as the "Great
Compromise:" Membership in the House of Representatives is based upon population,
whereas membership in the Senate is apportioned equally among the states. See generally A. KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BELz, supra note 134, at 97-100. For further
analysis of how regional conflict, both real and potential, shaped public debate and
policy in the early years of the republic, see J. DAVIS, SECTIONALISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 1774-1787 (1977); H. HENDERSON, PARTY POLITICS IN THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS (1974); McCoy, James Madison and Visions of American Nationality in
the Confederation Period.A Regional Perspective, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION 22658 (R. Beeman, S. Botein & E. Carter eds. 1987).
147 The Constitution contains several safeguards against unequal treatment of
states by the national government. See infra text accompanying notes 219-31.
148 See R. DAHL & E. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 53-65 (1973) (discussing
surveys indicating that citizens feel participation at the local level is more effective than
at the national level); J. NAGEL, PARTICIPATION 84-87 (1987) (opportunity for direct
democracy declines as size of polity increases and homogeneity decreases); Anton, Models of American Intergovernmental Relations 3 (paper prepared for Workshop on
Ocean Resources and Intergovernmental Relations in the 1980's, September 12-13,
1985) (describing participatory bias of federal political system). But see R. DAHL, DEIN THE UNITED STATES

MOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE

175-86 (4th ed.

1981) (citizens are less active and competition between political parties is less intense in
state and local elections than in national elections); Fitts, supra note 124, at 1641 n.259

19891

INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAKINGS

government offers citizens a broader array of opportunities to become
personally involved in civic affairs,' 4 9 greater influence over elected officials, 150 and an increased ability to monitor public affairs and hold government officials accountable for their actions. 5 '
In addition, as the recent literature on the "republican revival"' 5 2
makes clear, participation in public affairs can serve a less instrumental
function, quite distinct from merely promoting an accurate aggregation
of citizen preferences. Under this view, participation itself is beneficial,
infusing citizens with a sense of purpose and control over their lives.' 53
Participation in public affairs and the deliberative process engaged in
by citizens as part of this participation serves an educative and developmental function, permitting citizens to select values and develop a sense
of "empathy, virtue and feelings of community."'"
("the possibility exists, contrary to the classic civic virtue view, .
that dispersion of
authority to increase points of access will decrease general popular participation." (emphasis in original)).
149 Approximately 500,000 elected officials and 13,000,000 appointed officials
perform governmental functions for states and localities in the United States. See Anton, supra note 148, at 4.
150 See McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating The Founder's Design (Book Review), 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1509-10 (1987) (endorsing the position that constituents' influence on state legislators is proportionately greater than their influence on
members of Congress).
151 See Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
CoLUM. L. REV. 847, 853-54 (1979) (local government increases access and
accountability).
152 See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 90 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
153See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 33, at 1068-69 (contrasting "public" with "individual" freedom and characterizing a critique of Western society as the
limited ability of citizens to control their own lives); Rapaczynski, supra note 144, at
400 (political activity viewed as a good in itself, linked to human freedom).
154 See Sunstein, supra note 152, at 1556. See also J. NAGEL, supra note 148, at
13-15 (discussing developmental effects of participation); Frug, City as Legal Concept,
supra note 33, at 1069 (popular involvement in the decision-making process is possible
only at the local level); McConnell, supra note 150, at 1510 (accepting that civic virtue
could be cultivated only in small republics because the spirit of benevolence becomes
weaker as the distance between individual and object of benevolence increases);
Rapaczynski, supra note 144, at 402 (if non-instrumental participation is possible, it
can realistically exist only at local level).
However, claims that widespread participation at the local level contributes to the
public good may be overrated. Experience with efforts to decentralize urban power
frequently demonstrates that, contrary to producing altruism and civic virtue, citizen
participation and decentralized decision-making authority may lead to corruption and
the pursuit of parochial interests. See D. YATEs, NEIGHBORHOOD DEMOCRACY 160
(1973) ("[T]o the extent that neighborhood institutions articulate and act on their parochial interests, there is a clear tension between neighborhood democracy and the public
interest."); Barbanel, Koch Proposalsto Convert 2 Buildings to Shelters are Rejected,
N.Y. Times, March 12, 1988, at A36, col. 1 (New York City Board of Estimate rejects
conversion of vacant commercial buildings into homeless shelters in face of neighborhood opposition); Blumenthal & Verhovek, Of Patronage and Profit: Tale of School
Board 12, at Al, col. 1, (corruption within decentralized community school board);
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(iii) "Laboratories For Experimentation"
One of the most frequent justifications for federalism is reflected
by Justice Brandeis's famous observation that the nation benefits from
a system in which "a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory, and try social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country."1'55 Advocates of the "laboratory" justification of federalism point to numerous examples of state initiatives such
as unemployment compensation, health and safety regulations, and
public financing for political campaigns, which were later emulated by
a presumably more cautious national government.1 56
Other commentators have argued, however, that the experiments
taking place in states and localities are somewhat less impressive than
the proponents of federalism admit. Competition between states, sometimes cited by these advocates as increasing the likelihood of innovation,
might have the opposite effect. Rather than risk losing capital and jobs
to neighboring jurisdictions as a result of a failed experiment, states
and localities might be overly cautious in trying new approaches to deal
with social problems or service delivery.1 57 In addition, some have arBuder, Decentralizationof Schools Provided Painful Lessons, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
1988, at E6, col 1 ("decentralization [of schools] not only failed to fulfill many of the
early hopes but also spawned a range of abuses and excesses."); Polsky, Shelter Sites
Draw Community Ire, Newsday, Aug. 13, 1987, at 19, col. 1 (community opposition to
seventeen proposed shelters for the homeless).
...New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). Multiplying the number of independent legislative arenas creates manifold
opportunities for the development of unique solutions to problems which can be imitated by other states. See Macmahon, supra note 144, at 10 (multiplication of legislative arenas increases the scope of experimentation); McConnell, supra note 150, at
1498-1500 (same). The existence of independent centers of government may also make
possible the expression of political viewpoints that do not share the support of the entire nation. See, e.g., R. NATHAN & F. DOOLITTLE, REAGAN AND THE STATES 7
(1987) (states adopt programs associated with political liberalism when national government is dominated by conservatives).
' See Benson, supra note 144, at 13-14; Kmiec & Diamond, New FederalismIs
Not Enough: The Privatizationof Non-Public Goods, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
321, 342 (1984). "[S]tates may help Congress out by tackling novel policy issues and by
continuing to handle many familiar problems that Congress either chooses to ignore or
... fails to find a national solution for." Derthick, Preserving Federalism:Congress,
the States, and the Supreme Court, 4 BROOKINGS REV. 32, 35 (Winter/Spring 1986).
States' experimentation may also serve as a model for change in other states. See
Scheiber, American Federalismand the Diffusion of Power. Historicaland Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 619, 636 (1984) [hereinafter Scheiber, American
Federalism].
117 See G. BENSON, THE NEw CENTRALIZATION 23-24 (1941); Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 108, at 594. One of the reasons why competition in the public sector may be
less effective in promoting innovation than competition in the private sector is that
payoffs from successful innovation may be less immediate and visible. But see Walker,
The Diffusion of Innovations Among The American States, 63 AM. POL. Scr. REV.
880, 890 (1969) (interstate competition can promote diffusion of innovation). Interstate
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gued that states and localities lack the capacity
innovation.15 8

for efficient

(iv) Efficient Provision of Public Goods
A significant benefit of a political system that decentralizes decision-making authority is its ability to provide goods and services that
are responsive to the needs and desires of its citizens. If all public goods
and services were provided by the national government, it is likely that
they would be relatively uniform throughout the United States, even
though needs and desires might vary from region to region . 59 To the
extent that decisions are made by smaller units of government, there is
likely to be a greater correspondence between citizen demand and government production of public goods.'60 The increased likelihood that
competition for economic benefits may even promote a destructive "race to the bottom"
in state regulation of economic enterprises. Some commentators have argued that states
have an incentive to pass laws advantageous to corporate managers, but harmful to
shareholders. See Carey, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 668 (1974). But see Romano, Law as a Product:Some Pieces of the
IncorporationPuzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 279-81 (1985) (empirical evidence
shows that reincorporations in Delaware are not related to negative shareholder returns); Winter, State Law, ShareholderProtection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 251-52 (1977) (state regulation will lead to laws favorable to
stockholders).
"" See G. BENSON, supra note 157, at 40-42 (states are administratively inefficient and fail to conduct adequate research); COMMIrEE FOR EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING STATE GOVERNMENT 10-11 (1967) (noting that states have
failed to come to grips with economic and social issues). But see R. NATHAN & F.
DOOLITTLE, supra note 155, at 9, 362 (in the past two decades states have enhanced
their standing and capability); Beam & Benton, Intergovernmental Relations and
Public Policy: Down the Road, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 205-06 (J. Benton & D. Morgan eds. 1986) (discussing the resurgence of states
and localities); Reeves, Look Again at State Capacity: The Old Gray Mare Ain't What
She Used To Be, in AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS TODAY: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES 143 (R. Dilger ed. 1986) (cataloging recent improvements
in state administration).
11' See W. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 11 (1972); Anton, supra note 148, at 2425. One reason why nationally provided goods and services would tend to be uniform is
the desire to promote horizontal equity. A second, more practical, explanation is that
the national government may lack detailed information regarding the tastes and preferences of citizens residing in different parts of the country. See Benson, supra note 144,
at 11-13 (centralized bureaucracy may have insufficient information). The informational problem could be solved, however, by administrative, rather than political
decentralization.
100 The correspondence between demand and supply of public goods is, of course,
limited to "effective demand." Despite the significant need of their residents, many
central cities are unable to afford adequate social services due to severely limited tax
bases. See generally D. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CrrES: PRIVATE POWER
AND PUBLIC POLICY 198-253 (3d ed. 1988) (noting the restrictions on public budgets
from smaller tax bases, inflation, and various other social and economic pressures); J.
TEAFORD, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN CITY: PROBLEM, PROMISE, AND

REALITY 127-50 (1986) (detailing reasons for fiscal crises underlying the economies of
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demand and supply will correspond in smaller juridical units indicates
that provision of many public goods by states and local governments,
rather than by the national government, furthers economic efficiency.161
The interaction between decentralized decision-making authority
and citizen mobility also contributes to economic efficiency. According
to an economic model developed by Tiebout, 16 2 the ability of people to
move to different jurisdictions creates a market for public goods. Based
upon a set of "heroic" ' assumptions, including perfect information,
costless mobility, and the absence of external effects,"' Tiebout argues
central cities); W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (examining the decline of American cities
and the changing class structure of American ghettos); Clark, FiscalStrain: How Different are Snow Belt Cities? in THE NEW URBAN REALITY 253, 253-80 (P. Peterson
ed. 1985); Netzer, Financing Urban Government, in THE URBAN ECONOMY 41, 4156 (H. Hochman ed. 1976) (assessing the fiscal impact of changing demographics in
urban areas); Peterson, Finance, in THE URBAN PREDICAMENT 35, 35-118 (W.
Gorham & N. Glazer eds. 1976) (noting the problem of diminishing tax bases in cities
with growing public needs); Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political
Economy of Local Government, in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 55, 73 (G. Zodrow ed. 1983) ("[T]he fragmentation of metropolitan government systems has frequently been criticized because it
permits wealthy people to cluster together and avoid paying taxes that provide benefits
to low income people."); R. Nathan & C. Adams, Four Perspectives on Urban Hardship (Oct. 1988) (unpublished manuscript available from the authors).
11 See Benson, supra note 144, at 11. Cf H. ROSEN, supra note 92, at 509 ("It
is often argued that under a decentralized system . . . communities will provide the
types and quantities of public goods desired by their inhabitants."). The argument that
state and local decision-making authority encourages efficient provision of public goods
does not necessarily require that this authority be constitutionally guaranteed. See W.
OATES, supra note 159, at 17. At a minimum, to reap the benefits of decentralized
service provision, states and localities must have the ability to raise revenue from their
citizens and the power to decide how that revenue is spent. If efficient and responsive
provision of public goods by decentralized government is a value to be protected from
potential encroachment by the central government, a federal system that accords independent authority to sub-national governments is desirable. See Posner, The Constitution As An Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 28 (1987) ("the Constitution guarantees a limited sovereignty to the states and thereby increases the likelihood
that governmental services. . .will be provided efficiently."); cf. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 65-67 (1987) (one
difference between constitutional and ordinary legal rules is the former's durability);
Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 346 (1988) (constitutional provisions are more durable than legislation). To the extent that local power is
not subject to revocation, because it is constitutionally protected, citizens are more likely
to support the level of taxation necessary to achieve an optimal level of public spending.
162 See Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
418 (1956).
161 See Oates, An Economist's Perspective on Fiscal Federalism, in THE POLrICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 7 (W. Oates ed. 1977).
16
See Tiebout, supra note 162, at 419. The model also assumes: that consumers
could choose to live in a large number of different communities; that their mobility is
unhindered by employment considerations; and that communities below the optimum
size will seek to attract new residents through mechanisms such as advertisement,
whereas communities above or at optimum size will seek to discourage new residents by
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that citizens are consumers who choose to reside in communities that
provide their desired mix of public goods.115 In effect, the existence of
decentralized decision-making at the sub-national level permits individuals to "vote with their feet," selecting a package of taxes and services
that is more likely to reflect their preferences than any probable combination offered by the national government.1 66
b. Federalism, the Courts, and the Political Process
Discerning the appropriate relationship between states and the
federal government has engendered substantial, persistent, and perhaps,
inevitable conflict. Since the Constitution was ratified in 1787, courts
have repeatedly been called upon to referee states' claims that the national government has overstepped its constitutional authority and interfered in matters of state authority.6 Nevertheless, in the ensuing
years the Supreme Court has been unable to develop a doctrine to define the nature of state powers, and the extent to which these powers
are insulated from federal encroachment."6 8
using techniques such as exclusionary zoning. See id. at 419-20.
165 See id. at 418.
166 See id. at 418, 420. Although Tiebout's model provides support for the existence of decentralized decision-making authority, not all of its implications are salutary.
One outcome of such a system is that localities are likely to be economically homogenous, utilizing public regulations such as exclusionary zoning to keep out low income
households that would increase demand for public services, yet be unable to pay their
full share of the cost. See Oates, supra note 163, at 7-9 (Tiebout solution implies a
tendency toward segregation by income and use of exclusionary zoning).
Actions of states and localities have external effects, both negative and positive
which may be difficult to internalize due to ill-defined property rights, high transaction
costs and strategic bargaining. In these instances, a national government may be required to impose an efficient solution. See W. OATES, supra note 159, at 10-11; see
also Inman & Rubinfeld, A Federalist Constitution For An Imperfect World: Lessons
From the United States 23-24 (Jan. 1988) (unpublished manuscript available from the
Institute for Law and Economics, Univ. of Pa.) (an expanded role for national government is justified when localities are unable to bargain effectively).
Finally, citizen mobility, so essential to efficient outcomes under the Tiebout
model, may doom efforts by states and localities to redistribute income. See W. OATES,
supra note 159, at 6-8 (redistribution at local level will cause influx of low income
households and exodus of high income households); H. ROSEN, supra note 92, at 508
(same); Peterson & Rom, The Case ForA National Welfare Standard, 6 BROOKINGS
REv. 24, 29 (Winter 1988) (empirical evidence from the 1970's and 1980's shows that
increased welfare benefits in states are correlated with higher poverty rates); RoseAckerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1345 (1983)
("[S]tate and local governments are poor instruments of redistributive policy.").
167 Conversely, the federal government has also challenged state actions as interfering with federal authority. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat)
316 (1819) (state may not tax national bank).
18 In recent years the Court has stopped trying to develop a set of rules to protect
states from federal encroachment. Instead, the Court has adopted the view that the
states must look to the political process, rather than judicial review, for protection. For
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The source of this dilemma is the text of the Constitution. There
can be no doubt that the Constitution presumes that the states will continue to exist and function as governing bodies.1" 9 However, the nature
of the states' role in the federal system is, for the most part, undefined. 170 The powers to be exercised by the states are barely mentioned
in the Constitution. 17 1 The tenth amendment to the Constitution merely
makes explicit what is implicit in the text of the Constitution: All powers not delegated to the national government are reserved for the states
and the people.17 2 In contrast to the undefined nature of the states' role
under the Constitution, the national government is the recipient of
73
broad grants of power.'
Despite the absence of explicit textual references to state powers,
the rather meager protections against national encroachment and broad
a discussion of current Supreme Court doctrine on federalism, see infra text accompanying notes 186-201.
16 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, ci. 1 (members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen by the people of the several states); art. I, § 2, cI. 3 (census shall
be taken by state and Representatives apportioned by census); art. I, § 3, ci. 1 (Senate
composed of two members from each state); art. II, § 1,cl.2 (each state entitled to
number of Electors to choose President equal to number of Representatives and Senators); art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (state may invoke original jurisdiction of Supreme Court); art.
IV, § 4 (each state guaranteed a republican form of government, protection against
invasion and, upon application, protection against domestic violence).
170 The fact that the Constitution does not define state powers is unsurprising. At
the time the Constitution was ratified, states and their colonial forebears had been functioning as governmental bodies for many years. Undoubtedly, the Framers expected
state governments to continue providing public goods and services as they had under the
Articles of Confederation, except in those cases in which the Constitution forbade state
action, or gave powers exclusively to the national government. See infra note 174.
171 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.1 (states shall choose Senators) (later
modified by 17th Amendment); art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (states shall appoint electors); art. V
(states' role in ratifying constitutional amendments).
172 See U.S. CONsT. amend X. The Constitution is more explicit in detailing certain actions that states may not take. For example, states may not enter into treaties or
alliances, coin money, pass bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, impair the obligations of contract, grant titles of nobility, lay imposts or duties (except in limited circumstances), keep troops or ships of war in peacetime, engage in war unless invaded or in
imminent danger, or enter into interstate or foreign compacts. See id. art. I, § 10.
17. Among the enumerated powers are the power to regulate commerce, to tax, to
borrow money, and to wage war. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. The national government also is given the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution." Id. at art. I, § 8, cl.18. Moreover, pursuant to article VI, federal law is
supreme, notwithstanding any state law to the contrary. See id., at art. VI. The Constitution places some express limits on federal power over the states, most of which are
designed to protect the states' territorial integrity and political representation in the
national government. See, e.g., id. at art. I, § 8, cl.16 (states may appoint and train
officers of a militia that Congress may organize); id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (states cannot
be taxed on exports); id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (Congress may not discriminate among
state ports); id. at art. IV, § 3 cl.I (Congress may not join or divide states without
their consent); id at art. V (states shall not be denied equal suffrage in the Senate).
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language regarding national powers, it is inconceivable that the Framers intended the role of the states to be defined solely according to the
whims of the national government. 1 74 But as the nation grew, both economically and geographically, the activities of the national government
likewise expanded, assisted by broad judicial interpretations of the
powers specified in the Constitution. 17

5

It is perhaps not surprising that

as the national government grew, the sphere of authority once thought
to be reserved to the states, diminished. American intergovernmental
relations, once characterized by the term "dual federalism,"' 7 6 came to
be more accurately described as "cooperative federalism." 77 Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce became the major judicial battle174 See Scheiber, American Federalism, supra note 156, at 627. At the Constitutional Convention, the Virginia Plan, which would have made state legislation subject
to national veto, failed to gain approval. See supra note 142.
In their writings advocating ratification of the Constitution, Madison and Hamilton argued that the national government would have limited powers, leaving to the
states "inviolable sovereignty" over all other matters. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at
245 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 9, supra, at
76 U. Hamilton) (writing that proposed Constitution leaves exclusive sovereign powers
to states); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra, at 292 U. Madison) ("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.");
R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 59-61 (1987) (discussing Madison
and Hamilton's writings as envisioning dual federalism). But see Soifer, Truisms That
Never Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment And the Spending Power, 57 U. COLO.
L. REV. 793, 808 (1986) (asserting that THE FEDERALIST was "obviously and purposefully ambiguous on basic issues of federalism.").
175 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (commerce
clause); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-25 (1819) (necessary
and proper clause).
"" Dual federalism included constitutional doctrines based on the principles that:
1) the national government is one of enumerated powers only, 2) within their respective
spheres, states and the national government are sovereign and co-equal, and 3) the
relationship between states and the national government is one of tension, rather than
collaboration. See Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1950); Scheiber, American Federalism, supra note 156, at 628; Sundquist, American
Federalism: Evolution, Status and Prospects, 19 URB. LAW. 701, 715 (1987). For
examples of Supreme Court decisions applying concepts of dual federalism, see
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858); McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 410. Commentators frequently have used the metaphor of a layer cake to
describe dual federalism - the powers of each level of government being separate and
distinct. See, e.g., Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historicaland Contemporary Analysis of the American System, 14 L. & Soc'Y REv. 663, 670-71 (1980) (discussing the descriptive validity of the "layer-cake" metaphor for American federalism).
177 Cooperative federalism depicts a system in which the nation and the states
collaborate with each other and share resources to achieve public objectives. Public
functions are not carried out by only one government, as is typically implied by the
concept of dual federalism. See Elazar, The Shaping of Intergovernmental Relations
In The Twentieth Century, in THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 20 (D.
Elazar ed. 1969). In contrast to the layer cake metaphor associated with dual federalism, cooperative federalism makes use of a different confectionery metaphor - the
marble cake. See Grodzins, The Sharing of Functions, in THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN
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ground1" 8 between the states and the national government.1 7 9
Prior to 1937, private litigants had met with some success in overturning federal regulatory legislation on the ground that it interfered in
areas over which the states had exclusive authority. Supreme Court decisions rejected federal attempts to prevent monopolization of manufacturingi"', to ban the products of child labor,' and to regulate the
wages and hours of workers,"8 2 on the ground that these activities were
not part of interstate commerce. Nevertheless, after tremendous controversy, including the furor surrounding President Roosevelt's courtpacking plan, 8 3 the continued dislocation and unrest created by the
Great Depression, and a change in court personnel, the Supreme Court
eventually upheld federal legislation regulating wages and working
FEDERALISM, supra at 12 ("As colors are mixed in the marble cake, so functions are
mixed in the American federal system.").
178 The relationship between the states and the nation also changed dramatically
as a result of the Civil War. Not only did the Union's victory over the Confederacy
eliminate nullification and secession as viable legal doctrines, see E. POWELL, NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES, 375-76 (1897) (asserting that the
Civil War established the dissolubility of the Union, except by revolution), but the
post-war constitutional amendments set the framework for national legislation to protect individual rights. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974
(1982 & Supp. III 1985); Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). In addition, most of the rights contained in the first eight amendments
to the Constitution have been made applicable against the states by incorporation into
the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)
(speedy trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (freedom from self-incrimination);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 660 (1961)(freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1947)(establishment clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940) (free exercise clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
670-72 (1925) (freedom of speech and press); Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 228 (1897) Oust compensation for takings).
17
Conflicts over the nature of the relationship between states and the federal
government also have involved issues of sovereign immunity and judicial abstention.
See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (eleventh amendment sovereign immunity); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41, 44 (1971) (federal abstention based upon
principles of "Our Federalism").
"'0 United States v. B.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
181 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled, United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
18. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
...After several elements of President Roosevelt's New Deal legislation had been
struck down by the Supreme Court on the ground that they exceeded federal power, see
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Agricultural Adjustment Act);
Schecter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 495 (National Industrial Recovery Act), Roosevelt submitted a plan to Congress to "reform" the court system. He alleged the court system
was inefficient, partly due to "aged or infirm judges." W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 233 (1963). Under the proposed program the
President would have been empowered to appoint as many as six new judges to the
Supreme Court and forty-four new judges to the lower federal courts. The proposed
legislation failed to pass Congress. See id. at 232-38.
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conditions. In United States v. Darby Lumber Co. 84 the Court greatly
expanded the authority of the federal government, holding that Congress could regulate intrastate activities which affected interstate
85
commerce.1
The Court again considered the appropriate relationship between
states and the federal government in 1985. In Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan TransitAuthority,188 the Court held that Congress could,
pursuant to the commerce clause, extend the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of
a public transit authority, despite the transit authority's legal status as
a local public body. 8 7 The Court observed that the "principal means
chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal
system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."'"8 Citing
184312 U.S. 100 (1941).
185 The Court noted that the tenth amendment did not constitute an independent
limitation of federal power: "Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment.
...The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." Id. at 123-24.
Since Darby was decided in 1941, the Supreme Court has struck down federal
legislation on the ground that it exceeded the federal power to regulate interstate commerce only once. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court
held that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") violated the
Constitution. Under the FLSA amendments, local governments were required to observe federally prescribed minimum wage and maximum hour guidelines. Although the
Court recognized that the type of regulation contained in the FLSA was within the
commerce power, it drew a distinction between regulating private citizens and the
"States as States." National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845. According to the Court,
"there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not
be impaired by Congress . . . because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the
authority in that manner." Id. Under the National League of Cities regime, the Court
developed a three-prong test to determine whether federal regulation was valid. See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981).
To be invalidated the statute must: 1) regulate the "States as States," 2) address matters that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty, and 3) it must be apparent that
compliance by the states would directly impair their ability to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." See id. at 288 (quoting National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
Nine years after National League of Cities was decided, the Supreme Court overturned the decision. In Garcia, the Court concluded that making state immunity from
federal regulation turn on judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is "integral" or "traditional" was "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
108 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
187 The minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the FLSA challenged in
Garciawere similar to those struck down in National League of Cities. See supra note
185.
188 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550. The Court cited portions of THE FEDERALIST to
support its contention that states would be protected by the structure of the United

States government. See id. at 551-52 (citing Madison's statement that the equal representation of states in the Senate was "at once a constitutional recognition of the portion
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scholarly works by Choper 8 9 and Wechsler, 19 the Court catalogued
several ways in which the structure of the federal government protected
the states from overreaching by the national government, including the
states' control over electoral qualifications, their role in the Electoral
College, and their equal representation in the United States Senate.191
After establishing that the Constitution builds protections for states
into the federal system, the Court concluded that "the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the commerce clause
to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather than one of
result."' 92 In effect, the Court held in Garcia that the states may not
look to the judicial branch to protect their constitutional status, but
must instead rely upon the structure of the federal system.' 93 Nevertheless, the Court stopped short of holding that all issues of federalism are
non-justiciable. The Court noted that "[a]ny substantive restraint on
the exercise of commerce clause powers must find its justification in the
procedural nature of this basic limitation, and must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process ..
The Court also implied that some affirmative limits on9 5 federal action
affecting states under the commerce clause might exist,' but explicitly
of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that
residuary sovereignty." THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 378 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961)).
189 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 n. 11(citing J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980)) [hereinafter J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW].
190 See Garcia, 469

U.S. at 551 n.11 (citing Wechsler, The Political Safeguards
of Federalism:The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954)).
191 Garcia,469 U.S. at 551. In addition to those safeguards listed by the Supreme
Court in Garcia, Choper included the following among his list of structural protections:
1) each state has at least one representative in the House of Representatives, 2) state
legislatures draw district lines, 3) state delegations to Congress typically work together
and assist each other in getting advantageous committee assignments, 4) members of
Congress typically serve in state or local government prior to running for national office, and therefore, are sensitive to state concerns, 5) the President typically is obligated
to some degree to state and local parties for their help in the presidential election campaign, and 6) states and local governments have organized effective lobbying organizations. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 189, at 176-81.
192 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
193 In Garcia, the Court adopted much of the reasoning of Choper and Wechsler
regarding the role of the courts in determining questions of federalism. See J. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW,

supra note 189, at 175 ("[T]he constitutional issue of whether fed-

eral action is beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates 'states'
rights' should be treated as nonjusticiable . . . ."); Wechsler, supra note 190, at 559
("[T]he Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states .
.
1.4 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
19I See id. at 556. The Court cited Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), in
support of its statement that affirmative limits on federal action might exist. See Gar-
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refrained from identifying those limits."' 6
In a 1988 decision, South Carolinav. Baker,1 97 the Court elaborated on the types of failings of the national political process that might
justify judicial intervention to protect states from federal encroachment.
In rejecting South Carolina's tenth amendment challenge to a federal
tax law that subjected the interest earned on certain state and local
bonds to taxation,"9 8 the Court reiterated its holding in Garcia that
cia, 469 U.S. at 556. In Coyle, the Court examined whether Congress could, in admitting a state into the Union, require that its capital be located in a particular city for a
temporary period of time. The Court held that a state at the time of admission could
not be treated unequally with respect to existing states. Since an existing state could not
be forced by Congress to locate its capital in a city not of its choosing, see Coyle, 221
U.S. at 565, neither could a newly admitted state. See id. at 579. The Court noted that
the United States "was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority,
each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution itself." Id. at 567.
196 The majority decision in Garcia elicited sharp criticism from four dissenting
Justices. Justice Powell wrote that "[t]he Court's action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution." 469 U.S. at 577 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice
Powell argued that in limiting judicial review of federalism issues the majority violated
the principle set forth in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that it is
"the settled province of the federal judiciary 'to say what the law is' with respect to the
constitutionality of Acts of Congress." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 (quoting Marbury). In
addition, Powell cast doubt on the majority's contention that the structure of the federal
government would provide sufficient protection for the states. He wrote that changes
which have taken place in the twentieth century, including the adoption of the seventeenth amendment providing for the direct election of Senators, "have made Congress
increasingly less representative of state and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to the demands of various national constituencies." Id. at 565 n. 9. For additional
examples of changes that have weakened the influence of states on Congress, see How-

ard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789, 793 (1985); Kaden, supra note 151, at 86068. For scholarly critiques of the Garcia decision, see generally Howard, Garcia: Of
Federalism and Constitutional Values, 16 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM
17, 31 (Summer 1986) ("[N]o branch of government should be the ultimate and unfettered judge of its own powers."); Redish and Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and
JudicialReview: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 14 (1987) (the
Constitution "inescapably reveals the assumption that the states required at least a
certain degree of counter-majoritarian constitutional protection"); Van Alstyne, The
Second Death of Federalism, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1709, 1732 (1985) (Garcia treats the
Constitution as "not a Constitution as Law, but a constitution of more ordinary politics"). But see Choper, Law Before and After Garcia, in PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM: PAPERS FROM THE FIRST BERKELEY SEMINAR ON FEDERALISM 23, 23 (H.
Scheiber ed. 1987) (Garcia decision was a "welcome surprise"); Field, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of A Misguided Doctrine, 99
HARv. L. REV. 84, 103-06 (1985) (approving the overruling of National League of

Cities).

108 S. Ct. 1355, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 2837 (1988).
In South Carolinav. Baker, the Court upheld federal legislation that removes
the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term
bonds issued by states and localities, unless those bonds are issued in registered form.
See id. at 1368-69. Interest earned on debt obligations of states and local governments
197

198
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states must find their protection from federal regulation through the
political process."" 9 The Court further stated that "some extraordinary
defects in the national political process" might render regulation invalid
under the tenth amendment. 200 Nevertheless, the Court noted that
"South Carolina has not even alleged that it was deprived of any right
to participate in the national political process or that it was singled out
in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless."2 °1 By implication, the Court indicated that states could challenge federal incursions
on their authority in federal court if they could show that they had
somehow been excluded or politically isolated in the deliberation and
enactment process.
c. Intergovernmental Takings and the Political Process
The strongest justification for a constitutional rule requiring compensation for intergovernmental takings derives from the principles of
federalism. States and localities serve important, if controversial, functions in our political system. The existence of independent state decision-making power protects citizens from a potentially oppressive national government, provides numerous forums for citizen participation
in governance, increases the number of opportunities for innovative policy making, and promotes efficient and responsive delivery of some,
though not all, public goods. Uncompensated intergovernmental takings
could disrupt the ability of states and localities to function as governmental bodies and interfere with their ability to provide public goods
and services. In addition, the absence of a constitutionally mandated
compensation requirement would enable factions to gain control of the
national government and utilize the power of eminent domain to exploit the wealth of certain states. In a particularly bleak scenario, 0 2
is typically not taxable to the recipient. For a further discussion of South Carolinav.
Baker and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, see infra note 231.
For purposes of deciding the state's tenth amendment claim, the Court treated the
federal legislation as directly regulating states by prohibiting the issuance of bearer
bonds. See Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1360. A "bearer bond" is an unregistered debt obligation which entitles the holder to principal and interest payments. See id. at 1358.
199 See id. at 1360.
200

Id.

20 Id. at 1361 (emphasis added).
2 Throughout this section the scenario

of regional conflict and exploitation will
be used to justify a rule requiring compensation for all intergovernmental takings. I am
mindful of Justice Frankfurter's observation in New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572, 583 (1946), that "[tlhe process of Constitutional adjudication does not thrive on
conjuring up horrible possibilities that never happen in the real world and devising
doctrines sufficiently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest contingency." American interregional conflict and prejudice, unfortunately, is not merely a fanciful hypothetical devised by a law school professor to illustrate an abstruse point. To the con-
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groups of states or regions could coalesce and utilize this ability to disrupt state and local governments to oppress citizens from other states
and regions.
One inherent characteristic of intergovernmental takings - their
particularity - makes their intrusiveness especially problematic. Unlike most types of federal regulation, 20 3 intergovernmental takings
rarely, if ever, apply to large numbers of states; instead, takings single
out one state at a time. Thus, even if one were to accept the precepts of
Garcia, a judicial rule of compensation would be justified. Due to the
particularized nature of intergovernmental takings, states and localities
could not rely upon the political process to protect themselves from oppression by other states.20 This potential failure of the political process
could largely be remedied by an appropriate constitutional compensation requirement.
Even if compensation were not already required by federal courts,
it is unlikely that the adoption of such a rule would disrupt the federal
government. To the contrary, with respect to condemnations undertaken for benign motives, it is likely that Congress, itself, would adopt
a practice of universal compensation. In recent years, political economists have developed models to explain legislative behavior regarding
distributive policy in majority rule institutions. 2 5 Typically these modtrary, this nation has repeatedly experienced regional conflict since its founding. See
supra text accompanying notes 145-47. For a discussion of the recent resurgence of
regionalism, see infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, in New York v. United States, Justice Frankfurter, himself, proposed a rule that, by necessity, was overinclusive in application. In order to prevent
possible federal incursions into state activities, Frankfurter argued that any direct tax
on states could not discriminate against states, but must fall on private individuals as
well. 326 U.S. at 582. Like a compensation requirement for intergovernmental takings,
prohibiting discriminatory taxation stops or impedes the national government from taking certain actions, even though its motives in any particular action might be innocent,
and the effect on the states, benign. To protect against possible, if not likely, abuses, an
overinclusive prophylactic rule is required. Cf Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and
the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. Rv. 449, 450 & n.1 (1985) (arguing that the
federalism system should be informed by the "pathological perspective"). For further
discussion of the nondiscrimination principle set forth in New York v. United States, see
infra note 231.
203 But see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding the
Voting Rights Act against a claim that certain provisions were targeted against a small
number of states); Neuman, supra note 40, at 344 (1987) (observing that frequently
"federal law varies from state to state").
Cf Choper, Law Before and After Garcia, supra note 196, at 20 (admitting
2
that the desires of certain regions will periodically be "submerged" in Congress); Redish & Drizin, supra note 196, at 38-39 (political process may be insufficient to protect
a minority of states).
205 A distributive policy is one that confers benefits unequally to discrete portions
of the country. Examples of distributive programs include public works programs and
military installations. See Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective On Congressional
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els assume that: 1) legislators represent discrete geographic districts,
2) their primary motive is to win reelection, 3) they believe that programs which benefit their district will improve their chance for reelection, and 4) the cost of federal programs will be paid for by general
taxation. 6 Early models of legislative behavior typically indicated that
legislators would-maximize their districts' benefits and minimize the
cost to their constituents by forming coalitions with a bare majority to
pass public works programs. 207 Forming "minimum winning coalitions"' 208 enabled the smallest number of districts to maximize their
benefits from federal programs, while spreading the costs to losers as
well as winners.20 9 Minimum winning coalitions were expected to be
unstable over time, with new ones periodically forming. 2 0
Empirical studies have consistently shown that the model of minimum winning coalitions does not accurately portray how Congress operates. To the contrary, most studies show that congressional distributive programs are broadly inclusionary - containing benefits for the
districts of many more members of Congress than would be necessary
to secure passage of the legislation.2 1 ' The tendency to include benefits
for all congressional districts in legislation is referred to as "universalism. '212 Explanations of universalism center around the concept of unNorms, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 245, 246 (1979).
206 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 107, at 18 ("[Tlhe economic
assumption is simply that the representative or the average individual ... will choose
'more' rather than 'less'."); Fiorina, Universalism, Reciprocity, and DistributivePolicymaking in Majority Rule Institutions, in 1 RESEARCH IN PUB. POLICY ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 197, 204 (J. Crecine ed. 1981) (the district's tax share is exogenous to project
approval; legislators are primarily interested in reelection, and chances for reelection
increase with district benefits).
11 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 107, at 139; W. RIKER, THE
THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 247-78 (1962). But see B. BARRY, POLITICAL
ARGUMENT 253-56 (1965) (participants in political process will reach a "reasonable
solution" to ensure victory rather than rely on stable minimum winning coalitions).
208

W.

RIKER, supra note

207, at 270.

In effect, states or districts not included in a particular minimum winning coalition were exploited since they were excluded from receiving federal benefits, but nonetheless were forced to pay for them.
210 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 107, at 152 ("[A]ny single
winning coalition will be relatively unstable and impermanent."). As Shepsle and Weingast note, unstable minimum winning coalitions create "a kind of over-time universalism in which legislators take turns as members of the victorious MWC [minimum
winning coalition] . . . ." Shepsle & Weingast, PoliticalPreferences For The Pork
Barrel: A Generalization, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96, 97 (1981). For a discussion of
"universalism," see sources cited in infra note 212.
211 See, e.g., J. FEREJOHN, supra note 80, at 247 ("[Mlore than a bare majority
of congressional districts . .. and states received benefits from [water] projects in a
given year."); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 88 (1974)
(members of Congress follow policy of universalism).
212 See Fiorina, supra note 206, at 198; Weingast, supra note 205, at 249. See
generally, Cox & Tutt, Universalism and Allocative Decision Making in the Los An209
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certainty. Each legislator is uncertain whether she will be included in a
particular minimum winning coalition. Rather than be faced with the
prospect of going back to her constituents with no benefits and a bill for
programs benefiting other districts, a legislator will tend to vote for certain benefits for all, as well as certain costs. " 3 Inclusion can be seen as
14
a form of insurance.1
Although the model of universalism was developed to explain legislative behavior with respect to the distribution of benefits, its central
insight is likely to be applicable to the distribution of concentrated
costs,2 15 such as intergovernmental takings. A legislator is likely to be
geles County Board of Supervisors, 46 J. POL. 548 (1984) (discussing universalism in
Los Angeles county); Niou & Ordeshook, Universalism in Congress, 29 AM. J. POL.
ScI. 246 (1985) (discussing universalism as an optimal model for individual legislators);
Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 210 (extending universalism to pork-barrel politics).
213 See Cox & Tutt, supra note 212, at 551-54 (legislators will tend to vote for
benefits in an inclusionary fashion to insure against being in the minority and receiving
no benefits); Fiorina, supra note 206, at 209-11 (arguing that universalism is in the
long-term self-interest of the legislators); Niou & Ordeshook, supra note 212, at 256
(according to game theory, a strategy based on universalism will become the "preferred
legislative norm given each legislator's goal of reelection"); Shepsle & Weingast, supra
note 210, at 107-10 (universalism is a hedge against the uncertainty of not being in a
MWC); Weingast, supra note 205, at 249-52 (demonstrating mathematically that the
legislator's expected benefits of following a universalist approach exceed the expected
payoffs from a minimum winning coalition approach).
214 Cf Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 210, at 109 (universalism is "insurancelike").
21' Recent legislation enacted to deal with the problem of disposing of high level
nuclear waste illustrates the likelihood that Congress would adopt a universal approach
in distributing geographically concentrated burdens. For many years, federal policy
makers have grappled with the need to locate disposal sites for highly radioactive waste
generated by nuclear power plants, scientific research, and national defense activities.
For obvious reasons, past proposals to locate disposal sites in particular states have been
greeted by intense controversy, litigation, and political pressure. See J. SELEY, THE
POLITICS OF PUBLIC-FAcILITY PLANNING 87-112 (1983); Kneese, Typical Cases Involving Natural Resources, in REGIONAL CONFLICT AND NATIONAL POLICY 76-84
(K. Price ed. 1982). In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,
which established a framework for selecting disposal sites and provided for state consultation and cooperation. See Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 10101 to 10226 (1982 & West Supp. 1988)). The legislation also provided that an affected state could veto site selection subject to congressional override.
Despite these procedures for safeguarding state interests, the program continued to engender controversy. See Montange, FederalNuclear Waste Disposal Policy, 27 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 309, 376-405 (1987) (criticizing federal regulatory efforts to contain the
hazards of spent nuclear fuel).
In 1987, the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100203, §§ 5001-5604, 101 Stat. 1330-227 to 255 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101
to 10222 (West Supp. 1988)), designated a site in the Yucca Mountains of Nevada as
the first disposal site. The legislation also added a new provision designed to cushion
the impact of selecting the Nevada site and future disposal sites. Each Indian tribe on
whose reservation a site is located or state in which a site is located will be entitled to
substantial "benefits" ranging from five to twenty million dollars each year the disposal
facility is operated. See Pub. L. No. 100-203, at § 5031, 101 Stat. 1330-238. The
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uncertain whether public property in her district or state will be required by the federal government. Rather than take the chance of being
forced to explain to her constituents why she could not forestall the
harm, a rational2" 6 legislator might prefer to adopt a universal rule of
compensation for intergovernmental takings.21 7 Each legislator would
support marginally increased taxes, in return for insurance against the
risk of uncompensated takings of public property in her district.
While the political process might be sufficient to protect states
from random or benign takings, it is highly unlikely to protect states or
localities from exploitative intergovernmental takings. A universal practice of compensation would almost certainly not be extended to takings
designed to exploit individual states or groups of states. Providing compensation to such states would raise the cost of exploitative behavior to
states in control of the legislative process, and lessen the disruption to
the states in which condemnations occurred. Provided that the coalition
of states in power could assure themselves against defections,21 8 a compensation rule would be self-defeating.
The proposition that states require constitutional, rather than
merely legislative, protection from the threat of regionalism is implicit
in the Constitution. Among the constitutional provisions designed to
protect states from discriminatory treatment at the hands of the national political process, the tax uniformity clause 1 9 is most relevant to
benefits authorized by the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act are consistent with
an extension of the norm of universalism to geographically concentrated burdens as
well as benefits. Members of Congress, uncertain as to where a facility might be located in the future, agree ex ante to compensate each other's constituents for a burden
they might each have to bear.
216 A legislator who is risk averse would be even more likely to support a universal compensation rule than would a risk neutral legislator. Cf Weingast, supra note
205, at 252 ("Risk averse legislators . . . favor reductions in their risk of defeat.").
2"'
The precise mechanics of a universal practice of compensation for intergovernmental takings may depend upon which branch of government makes the ultimate selection of the specific parcels of property to be condemned. For condemnations specifically authorized by legislation, see, e.g., United States v. 929.70 Acres of Land, 205 F.
Supp. 456, 457 (D.S.D. 1962) (Congress expressly or impliedly included property
within authorization statute by specifically mentioning it in legislative reports.), Members of Congress would likely develop an informal norm of logrolling, including in each
statute compensation for state or local condemnees. Because Members of Congress
would frequently delegate the choice of particular parcels of property to administrative
agencies, see, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242-43 (1946) (choice of
specific parcel to be condemned left to the discretion of administrative agency), it is also
likely that legislation would be enacted to provide for uniform compensation for all
state or local property so selected.
218 One can imagine numerous situations in which legislators could not be persuaded or "bribed" to cease exploiting other states or regions. Animosities between
regions over economic development and racial or ethnic populations could make legislators resistant to defection.
219 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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the problem of intergovernmental takings.22 ° A taking is, in many
ways, analogous to a tax - both require the owner of wealth or property to donate a portion of her assets to the government for public
use.21 In addition, both the tax uniformity clause and a compensation
requirement for intergovernmental takings are designed to protect entities and individuals from being invidiously singled out for discriminatory treatment by the national political process.
The tax uniformity clause requires that "all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."2'22 The Court
has interpreted the clause to apply to indirect taxes, including most
sources of federal revenue other than the income tax.2 2 According to a
recent Supreme Court case, the clause was included in the Constitution
to prohibit Congress from discriminating against particular states:
Some States [at the Constitutional Convention] . . . re-

mained apprehensive that the regionalism that had marked
the Confederation would persist. There was concern that the
National Government would use its power over commerce to
the disadvantage of particular States. The Uniformity Clause
was proposed as one of several measures designed to limit
the exercise of that power.22 4
220 Among the other constitutional provisions preventing federal discrimination
among states are the bankruptcy and naturalization uniformity clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and the port preference clause, art. I, § 9, cl.6. See also Coyle v.
Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565-68 (1911) (equal footing doctrine with respect to admission
of new states under art. IV, § 3, cl. 1).
221 Cf. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 283-305 (various forms of taxation are
takings).
222 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
1.
22 The Constitution requires that direct taxes be apportioned among the states.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Prior to 1895, the Supreme Court
interpreted direct taxes to include only capitation taxes and taxes on real estate. See,
e.g., Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (Civil War income tax is not a
direct tax); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) (duty on state bank
notes is indirect tax). Nevertheless, in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 158 U.S. 429
(1895), the Court held that a tax on income was a direct tax and thereby unconstitutional because it was not apportioned. 158 U.S. at 634-35. In 1913, the Sixteenth
Amendment effectively reversed Pollock by empowering the United States to tax incomes without apportionment. See 1R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 5.3 (1986) (historical
background and current status of direct versus indirect taxes); Annotation, Supreme

Court's View as to Constitutionality of Federal Tax Legislation Under Uniformity
Clause of Article I, § 8, Clause 1 of Federal Constitution, 76 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1985)
(analyzing the cases in which the Supreme Court has construed the uniformity clause).
22 United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 81 (1983) (citation omitted). The
Court continued its discussion of the purpose of the tax uniformity clause by quoting
from Justice Story:
[The purpose of the clause] was to cut off all undue preferences of one
State over another in the regulation of subjects affecting their common
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In United States v. Ptasynski,22" the Court stressed the importance
of preventing discrimination against individual states. The respondent
in Ptasynski had challenged the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of
1980226 on the ground that it exempted certain oil produced in particular geographic areas, primarily in Alaska. The Court stated that "a
'tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every
place where the subject of it is found.' "227 Congress may define the
subject of a tax in geographic terms, but its choice will be examined
"closely [by the Court] to see if there is actual geographic discrimination. '228 The Court upheld the exemption, noting that it was supported
by valid policy objectives, 22' and that it was not coterminous with state
political boundaries. 23 0 Thus, in the Ptasynski decision, the Supreme
Court reiterated the importance of constitutional doctrine protecting
states from being discriminated against by the national government.23 1
interests. Unless duties, imposts, and excises were uniform, the grossest
and most oppressive inequalities, vitally affecting the pursuits and enjoyments of the people of different States, might exist. The agriculture, commerce, or manufactures of one State might be built up on the ruins of
those of another; and a combination of a few States in Congress might
secure a monopoly of certain branches of trade and business to themselves,
to the injury, if not to the destruction, of their less favored neighbors." 1 J.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of The United States § 957 (T.
Cooley ed. 1873).
462 U.S. at 81.
225

462 U.S. 74 (1983).

22
227

26 U.S.C. §§ 4986-4998 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
462 U.S. at 82 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884)).

228

Id. at 85.

Among the rationales cited by the Court for the exemption were the higher
cost of oil production in arctic and sub-arctic regions caused by severe weather, remoteness, and geological and environmental conditions. See id. at 78, 85.
229

211

See id. at 85-86.

In another recent decision, South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S.Ct 1355 (1988),
the Supreme Court again recognized that the political process, alone, may be insufficient to protect states from discriminatory treatment. In the South Carolina decision,
the Supreme Court upheld a federal tax on interest income earned on certain debt
obligations issued by state and local governments. The Court overturned much of what
remained of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity which had prohibited federal taxation of private individuals and entities employed by or doing business with
states. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (interest from
municipal bonds not subject to federal taxation), overruled, Baker, 108 S.Ct. at 1355;
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871) (income of county judge immune from
federal taxation), overruled, Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). Nevertheless,
with respect to direct taxation of states and localities, the Court implicitly approved and
retained the nondiscrimination principle set forth by Justice Frankfurter in New York
v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). See supra note 202. In responding to the dissent's position that lifting intergovernmental tax immunity would leave states at the
mercy of Congress, the majority opinion argued that the nondiscrimination principle
provides sufficient protection. If the federal government tried to destroy a state by ruinous taxation, a requirement that the tax be applied to private, as well as public entities
would ensure that public pressure would be brought to bear against the tax in Con21
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Implicit in the Constitution and the Ptasynski decision is the proposition that the "political safeguards of federalism" are insufficient to
protect states and their citizens from regional exploitation. Conflict
among regions has played a central role in the history of the nation.
Fears of interstate rivalry and exploitation took on great importance at
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the ensuing ratification process. 2 ' Repeated conflicts among states and regions in the succeeding
two hundred years, one erupting into a bloody war, have justified these
concerns.

233

During much of the twentieth century, however, regionalism
seemed to be on the decline. In fact, during the 1950's and 1960's some
political scientists questioned whether increased regional interdependence and mobility would lead to the demise of American sectionalism. 34 However, a sharp increase in conflict between states and regions
in recent years has undercut those who prophesied the death of regionalism. The energy crisis of the 1970's and the exodus of manufacturing
from the northeast to the south and southwest are only two of the
causes of renewed regional tension and conflict pitting the "frostbelt"
against the "sunbelt."
Interregional hostility has frequently taken the form of groups of
states using the national political process to advantage themselves, by
disadvantaging other regions. Conflicts have erupted over the distribution of federal intergovernmental assistance, with each region forming
organizations to lobby for a greater share of federal largess.2 3 5 In addigress. 108 S. Ct. at 1367 n.14.
232 See supra note 146.
233 Although most sectional conflicts pitted North against South, a number polarized East and West. See J. TURNER, PARTY AND CONSTITUENCY: PRESSURES ON
CONGRESS 191-209 (E. Schneier, Jr. rev. ed. 1970). As Frederick Jackson Turner
noted in the 1920's, "sectionalism was the dominant influence in shaping our political
history." F. TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SECTIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 323
(1932); see also R. BENSEL, SECTIONALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEvELopMENT 1880-1980, at 5 (1984) ("The existence of sectionally based political conflict
constitutes the most massive and complex fact in American politics and history."). Turner, after assessing the historical importance of sectionalism, predicted that regional
self-consciousness and differences would become magnified as the nation matured and
"crystallized sections feel the full influence of their geographic peculiarities, their special interests, and their developed ideals." F. TURNER, supra, at 45.
234 See, e.g., V. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 245-48 (1964)
(inevitable sectional differences would decline in importance as north and south become
increasingly interwoven); J. TURNER, supra note 233, at 189 (recent decline in southern solidarity will likely lead to decline in interregional conflict); Key, The Erosion of
Sectionalism, 31 VA. Q. REV. 161 (1955) (sectional differences would decline in importance); MacMahon, supra note 144, at 18-19 (observing that "[m]uch of the petty,
protective protectionism of the depression period has been overcome.").
235 See generally, R. DILGER, THE SUNBELT/SNOWBELT CONTROVERSY: THE
WAR OVER FEDERAL FUNDS (1982). Cf Evans, Sunbelt versus Frostbelt: The Evolu-
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tion, federal environmental legislation has been utilized to favor eastern
and midwestern commercial interests at the expense of those located in
the west. 236 States and regions have also aggressively sought to disadvantage commercial interests from other sections of the country by enacting "exploitative" legislation such as restraints on imports, natural
resource severance taxes, and taxes on the incomes of interstate businesses that are already subject to taxation elsewhere.23 7
In light of recent history, concerns that uncompensated intergovernmental takings could be used to exploit individual states and regions
do not seem far-fetched. An interpretation of the fifth amendment requiring the United States to compensate states and localities when it
condemns their property need not be grounded on the similarity of public and private entities. To the contrary, a compensation requirement
may be justified as necessary to protect states from exploitation and
rent-seeking.2 3
tion of Regional Conflict Over Federal Aid To Cities in the House of Representatives,
67 Soc. ScI. Q. 108, 108 (1986) (disparity between sunbelt and frostbelt support for
urban aid is increasing).
26 See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 46-47 (1981)
(discussing how an amendment to the Clean Air Act supported by eastern commercial
interests and environmentalists passed Congress despite opposition from western commercial interests); R. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 110-130 (1983) (Representatives from the
northeast supported Clean Air Act amendments for the purpose of limiting growth in
the South and West); Crandall, Clean Air and Regional Protectionism, 2 BROOKINGS
REV. 17, 18 (1983) ("It seems quite clear that members of Congress from the Frost
Belt are the strongest supporters of a set of policies that deliberately discourage the
construction of new plants in those regions of the country where new facilities are most
likely to be built - the South and West."); Landsberg, Energy "Haves" and "HaveNots", in REGIONAL CONFLICT AND NATIONAL POLICY, supra note 215, at 36-38
(Clean Air Act amendments were designed to assist eastern commercial interests).
237 See Kneese, supra note 215, at 67-75; Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and
Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REv. 563, 570-75 (1983). Additional issues which
divide regions and threaten to provoke conflict include acid rain, toxic waste disposal,
and protectionism. See, e.g., R. BENSEL, supra note 233, at 408 (protectionism); Crandall, supra note 236, at 20 (acid rain); Kneese, supra note 215, at 75-84 (nuclear
waste disposal).
28 Interpreting the just compensation clause to require compensation for states
and localities as a protection against regionalism is, of course, both over- and underinclusive. To protect against the possibility of regional exploitation, compensation will
be required for all takings, even those motivated by purely benign objectives. In addition, requiring compensation for intergovernmental takings will not leave Congress
without other means to discriminate against individual states and regions. See, e.g.,
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (discussed supra note 203); 12
U.S.C. § 1713(c)(2) (1982) (mortgages on housing in Alaska not subject to certain
limitations that apply to other states); 42 U.S.C. § 418(d)(6)(G) (1982) (seven specific
states allowed separate retirement systems). See generally Neuman, supra note 40, at
344-59 (discussing federal burdens on particular states and the District of Columbia).
Nevertheless, the existence of gaps in constitutional protections against interstate discrimination and exploitation does not justify removing all other protections.
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III.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAKINGS
COMPENSATING THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONDEMNEE

In United States v. 50 Acres of Land,29 the Supreme Court held
that when the federal government condemns property owned by a state
or locality, it must treat the public condemnee in the same manner as it
would a private individual.2 4 Because the federal government pays private individuals the fair market value of their property, state and local
governments are entitled to no more. Underlying the Court's decision
that public and private condemnees should be treated equally is the
premise that compensation serves the same function for both.
As I have demonstrated in Part II, the premise underlying 50
Acres of Land is inaccurate. The justifications for compensating public
entities are not identical to the rationales typically offered for compensating private property owners. The role that compensation plays in
preventing unfair burdens and minimizing investment risks for private
citizens is much less important when the condemnee is a public entity.
Instead, other functions served by compensation - the prevention of
fiscal illusion and the protection of states and localities from exploitation - justify compensation for intergovernmental takings.
By failing to analyze carefully why compensation is necessary for
intergovernmental takings, the Supreme Court prescribed a method of
computation that fails to achieve these objectives. Although compensation based upon the fair market value of the property taken may force
federal policy makers to take the costs of their actions into account, it
does not sufficiently protect the integrity of states and localities. Intergovernmental condemnees should receive compensation over and above
the fair market value of the property taken, when they can demonstrate
that there is a need to replace the condemned property and that the
replacement cost exceeds its market value.
In Part III, I briefly describe how compensation is computed for
federal condemnations of private property, and then trace the development of rules governing compensation for intergovernmental takings,
culminating in the 50 Acres of Land decision. Finally, I conclude that
a method of compensation similar to the one repudiated by the Supreme Court in 50 Acres of Land is more appropriate than the current
fair market value standard, if states and localities are to be protected
from disruption and exploitation. If states and localities can demonstrate that the public facility taken by the federal government provided
a benefit that would not be as fully provided after the condemnation,
they should be entitled to a compensation award in excess of the prop469 U.S. 24 (1984).
240 See id. at 31.
2.9
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erty's fair market value. To protect states and localities from disruption
and exploitation, as well as to promote economic efficiency, intergovernmental condemnees should be entitled to the cost of replacing the
condemned facility less the amount by which the condemned property
had depreciated.
A. Just Compensation For Private Condemnees
Although the Supreme Court has consistently stated that the purpose of the just compensation clause is to protect private individuals
from bearing unfair burdens,2 4 it has been less consistent in formulating rationales for how that compensation should be computed. In most
eminent domain cases, the Court states that the objective of compensation is to indemnify the condemnee; the person whose property is taken
by the federal government is "entitled to be put in as good a position
pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken." 242 An indemnification objective necessarily focuses on the value of the property to the
owner; otherwise one could not be sure that the condermnee was "made
whole" following the condemnation. At the same time, however, the
Court has stressed that compensation is not for the owner, but for the
property.24 " Indeed, the Court seems to have disregarded the owner's
measure of value in stating that "[tihe value compensable under the
Fifth Amendment

. .

. is only that value which is capable of transfer

from owner to owner. . "..."" In contrast to an indemnity approach,
compensating only transferrable values seems to shift attention from
what the condemnee has lost, to what the condemnor gains.2 45
Although the Court continues to restate the indemnification princiSee supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). See also Almota Farmers
Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-78 (1973) (deciding
that a lessee with no right of renewal is entitled to compensation equal to the fair
market value of its leasehold improvements, taking into account the possibility that the
lease might or might not be renewed); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16
(1970) (discussing how to account for the effects of the condemnation itself on the fair
market value); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) (just compensation
means receiving the "full and perfect" monetary equivalent of the property taken).
11 See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)
("just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to the owner").
2" Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949); see United States
v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 514 (1979) ("nontransferable values arising
from the owner's unique need for the property are not compensable").
11 See Kanner, supra note 102, at 781 (discussing clash between the value the
taker acquires and the indemnification of owner); Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 67 (1957)
(limiting compensation to tangible property rights effectively means government must
pay for what it gains rather than what condemnee loses).
241
242
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ple, recent decisions make it clear that compensation should be based
upon transferrable value only.""8 In computing compensation courts are
instructed to determine the fair market value of the property taken.
One leading commentator defines fair market value as "the amount of
money which a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy the property
would pay to an owner willing but not obliged to sell it, taking into
consideration all uses for which the land was suited and might in reason be applied. ' 24 7 For reasons of simplicity24 8 and economy, 24 9 owners
are not indemnified for economic losses attributable to business disrup246 See supra note 244. The Court has acknowledged that its rules of compensation fail to give the principle of indemnification "its full and literal force." 564.54
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511; see also Kirby Forest Indus. Inc. v. United States, 467
U.S. 1, 10 n.15 (1984) ("We have acknowledged that, in some cases, this standard [fair
market value] fails to indemnify the owner for his loss.").
247 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 1, at § 12.211]. Courts usually
utilize one of three methods to determine a property's fair market value: comparable
sales, income capitalization, or reproduction cost minus depreciation. See United States
v. Certain Property In Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1968). See
generallyJ. GELIN & D. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 4.14.3 (1982); 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 1, at §§ 12.1-12.51; 1

ORGEL ON VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1953).

If the property is of a type that is frequently bought and sold, a court will determine its value by referring to comparable sales (i.e. sales similar in time, quantity, and
quality). Courts view the comparable sales method as giving the most accurate estimate
of a property's fair market value. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-75
(1943) (if condemned property or similar property has not been recently sold then estimate of its fair market value will be an informed guess); United States v. Whitehurst,
337 F.2d 765, 775 (4th Cir. 1964) (comparable sales are the best evidence of market
value).
If sufficient comparable sales for an income-producing property do not exist, a
court may determine its value by analyzing what amount an investor would pay for the
stream of income generated by the building - the income capitalization method. Finally, for special purpose properties such as churches and institutional buildings which
are seldom sold and do not generate income, courts will estimate the amount it would
cost to reproduce the condemned property. Because the condemned property is typically
not new, the court usually estimates how much it has depreciated and deducts that
amount from the reproduction cost. Because many courts are skeptical about the degree
of correspondence between reproduction cost and a property's fair market value, the
reproduction-cost-minus-depreciation method of valuation is typically used only in exceptional cases. See, e.g., United States v. 1132.50 Acres of Land, 441 F.2d 356, 358
(2d Cir. 1971) (criticizing reproduction cost method), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850
(1971); United States v. 55.22 Acres of Land, 411 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1969)
("Generally speaking, reproduction cost is not considered the best evidence of fair market value. . . ."); 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 1, at § 12.313, ("evidence of reproduction cost is admissible only in exceptional cases.").
2'l See 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511 (because of "serious practical
difficulties" in determining the worth of individual properties, the Court requires an
objective working rule).
249 See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)
(The dominant consideration is: "What compensation is 'just' to both an owner whose
property is taken and to the public that must pay the bill?").
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25 2
or litigation expenses.151
lost goodwill,2 ' relocation costs,

B. Just Compensation For Intergovernmental Condemnees
Prior to 1984, most courts computed compensation for intergovernmental takings based upon the substitute facilities doctrine, rather
than the fair market value standard. Under the substitute facilities
measure, states and localities were entitled to the cost of constructing a
"functionally equivalent substitute" 54 when the federal government
condemned public property. Most courts required compensation for
substitute facilities only if it were necessary for the state or locality to
replace the facility taken.155 Although some courts required that the
state or locality be legally compelled to replace the facility, 56 most
250 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 365, 383 (1945) (injury
to business is not to be included in compensation award); United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281 (1943) (frustrated business plans are
not compensable); Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925) (destruction of
agricultural business not compensable). But see Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,
338 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1949) (condemnee might be entitled to lost business profits during
period of temporary taking, due to the impracticability of relocating).
Several commentators have criticized federal condemnation practices on the ground
that they fail to compensate for incidental and consequential losses. See, e.g., Bigham,
"FairMarket Value," "Just Compensation," and the Constitution: A Critical View,
24 VAND. L. REV. 63, 65-66 (1970) (objecting to the government's failure to make the
condemnee whole); Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1277, 1278-79 (1985) (noting that market value does not
always reflect all of the costs borne by the condemnee); Francis, Eminent Domain Compensation in Western States: A Critique of the FairMarket Value Model, 1984 UTAH
L. REV. 429, 430-41 (noting examples of disparities between market value and the
value derived by the owner from the property); Comment, supra note 245, at 61 (noting costs borne unfairly by owners and lessees of property).
251 See General Motors, 323 U.S. at 383 (lost goodwill is noncompensable); R.
EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 80-86 (criticizing the failure of courts to compensate for
lost goodwill); Aloi & Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and Business
Losses In Eminent Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 604, 635 (1968) (courts fail to compensate for "going business" value).
252 See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261, 264
(1950) (when entire property interest of condemnee is taken, removal costs are not
compensable); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 378 (1946) (cost of
relocating business not compensable when government takes leasehold interest even
though lease contains renewal option); General Motors, 323 U.S. at 383 (removal damages may not be compensated as independent items of damage though they may be
taken into consideration in determining market value of temporary occupancy).
25I See United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979) (attorneys' fees
and litigation expenses not included in compensation award).
2"5 United States v. Certain Property In Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d 800,
803-04 (2d Cir. 1968). Some courts deducted an amount representing the depreciation
of the condemned facility from the cost of reconstruction. See id. at 804 n.11.
255 See City of Fort Worth v. United States, 188 F.2d 217, 221 (5th Cir. 1951)
(city entitled to an award sufficient to restore necessary roads).
258 See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler Township, 66 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir.
1933) (township is entitled to compensation when it is the "legally compellable duty of
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courts held that if replacement was reasonably necessary to meet the
needs and desires of their citizens, compensation should be paid.25 In
instances where substitute facilities were not necessary, some courts
awarded no compensation or nominal compensation,2 58 while others required the federal government to pay states and localities the fair market value of the property taken.2 59
Courts gave two reasons for deviating from fair market value to
invoke the substitute facilities doctrine. Many courts reasoned that the
concept of fair market value had little relevance to takings of publicly
owned property. Roads, parks, and public buildings and facilities are
seldom sold, and judges found it both difficult and artificial to determine their market value.2 60 Secondly, courts seemed to recognize that
states and localities typically hold property for different purposes than
private individuals.2 ' While fair market value may be adequate to
compensate condemnees who own property primarily for economic or
commercial advantages,26 2 it may not be sufficient to prevent serious
the township to maintain" the function provided by the condemned property); United
States v. Alderson, 53 F. Supp. 528, 530-31 (S.D. W. Va. 1944) (if state road is damaged and state is legally compelled to replace road, substitute facility is appropriate
compensation).
251 See Certain Property In Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d at 803-04; County
of Sarpy v. United States, 386 F.2d 453, 457-58 (Ct.Cl. 1967).
258 See, e.g., United States v. Streets, Alleys and Public Ways In Stoutsville,
531
F.2d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 1976) (no compensation is due if there is no reasonable necessity to replace roads condemned by federal government); United States v. Certain
Lands Located in Raritan and Woodbridge, 246 F.2d 823, 824 (3d Cir. 1957) (if substitute highway is not necessary, no compensation is due); Woodville v. United States,
152 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir.) (if substitute street is not necessary, city is not entitled to
substantial damages), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 842 (1946).
259 See, e.g., United States v. 3,727.91 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d 357, 360-61 (8th
Cir. 1977) (drainage district entitled to fair market value of land condemned even
though it would not replace levees and ditches); California v. United States, 395 F.2d
261, 266-68 (9th Cir. 1968) (state entitled to monetary value of condemned underwater
parcels despite lack of necessity for replacement); United States v. Certain Land in
Borough of Brooklyn, 346 F.2d 690, 695-96 (2d Cir. 1965) (if new playground is not
necessary the city is entitled to value of property taken by federal government); United
States v. Jacksonville, 257 F.2d 330, 333-34 (8th Cir. 1958) (city entitled to scrap or
salvage value of condemned sewage system even though replacement not necessary).
280 See Certain PropertyIn Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d at 802-04 (market
value test is often unworkable because public facilities are not commonly bought and
sold on the open market).
261 See Jefferson County v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 146 F.2d 564, 565 (6th Cir.)
(highway easements are "totally unlike" property held by private entities), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 871 (1945).
262 Current methods of computing compensation based upon fair market value,
however, may fail to indemnify adequately even those who own property solely for its
commercial or economic value. Most courts exclude from condemnation awards compensation for business losses, lost goodwill, relocation expenses, litigation costs, and
other consequential and incidental losses. See supra notes 250-53. Perhaps even more
importantly, many people own property for reasons other than economic or instrumen-
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disruptions to states and localities which are required to maintain provision of public goods and services.26
The demise of the substitute facilities doctrine began with a 1979
Supreme Court decision, United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land.2 64
The respondent, a private, nonprofit religious group, operated three
summer camps which were condemned for a federal recreational project. The three camps had been exempted from expensive regulation
under a grandfather provision. Respondent contended that it was entitled to the cost of developing functionally equivalent facilities on a new
site; an award based on the fair market value of the property would not
enable it to do so because new property for rebuilding the camps would
not enjoy the former exemption from government regulation.26 5
At trial,266 the district court judge instructed the jury that it could
award compensation based upon the substitute facilities doctrine if it
tal advantage. For example, property may be intimately bound up with a person's
identity and be necessary for that person to flourish. See Baker, supra note 121, at 76164; Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). Compensation
based upon fair market value standards fails to include a component for a person's
subjective valuation of his or her property. Therefore, for "personal property," such as
a home, fair market value - or perhaps any monetary compensation - will often be
insufficient to make a person whole after a condemnation. See Radin, supra, at 100208; cf. Ellickson, Alternatives To Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cni. L. REV. 681, 736-37 (1973) (providing a bonus over
fair market value may be a desirable system to compensate lost consumer surplus attributable to condemnation of nonfungible property).
Much of the present critique of current methods of computing compensation for
intergovernmental takings applies with equal force to compensation for takings of private property. Compensation based upon the fair market value of condemned property
may be inadequate to ensure that the functions served by the just compensation clause
are fulfilled. Although a discussion of the appropriate method for compensating private
condemnees is beyond the scope of this article, some aspects of the compensation rule
proposed for public condemnees would also be applicable to their private counterparts.
However, it is also likely that an appropriate compensation rule for private property
owners would differ in several respects from the rule advocated herein. See infra note
281 (illustrating how fair market value method of compensation might be appropriate
for private condemnee, but not public condemnee). For example, compensation for subjective losses is considerably less relevant for public condemnees than for individual
citizens. Moreover, a compensation rule for "fungible property" would likely include
elements for consequential and incidental damages that would be unnecessary for either
owners of personal or public property. Cf Radin, supra, at 986 (distinguishing personal property from fungible property).
263 See Certain Land In Borough Of Brooklyn, 346 F.2d at 695 (loss of public
property may put a "serious strain on other public facilities").
2-

265

441 U.S. 506 (1979).
See id. at 508.

266 The Third Circuit had earlier reversed the District Court's ruling that respondent was only entitled to the fair market value of the property. See United States v.
564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796, 800-02 (3d Cir. 1974) (nonprofit organizations
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found that the property "'fulfill[ed] a community need or purpose.' "'67
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the jury's verdict
in favor of the government on the ground that the district court had
defined "reasonable necessity" too stringently. According to the court,
for a facility to be reasonably necessary, "it must provide a benefit to
the community that will not be as fully provided after the facility is
taken."2 6
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that compensation based on
the fair market value of the property was feasible because a market,
albeit a thin market, existed for the sale of campgrounds. 26 9 In addition, the Court found that even though the respondent might not be
fully indemnified by an award based upon the fair market value of the
campgrounds, such an award was consistent with past rulings holding
that nontransferable values arising from an owner's unique need for
condemned property are not compensable.2 70 Furthermore, the Court
observed that as a private entity, the respondent would not be required
to use the compensation to rebuild the facilities and, therefore, compensation based upon the substitute facilities doctrine might constitute a
windfall. 1
In a footnote to 564.54 Acres of Land, the Court also cast doubt
upon the propriety of compensating states and local governments according to the substitute facilities doctrine. 27 2 Although the Court expressed no formal opinion on that issue, it distinguished and limited an
earlier Supreme Court decision that many had interpreted as placing
the Court's imprimatur on the substitute facilities doctrine.2 ' Five
are entitled to substitute facilities compensation if no ready market exists for property
and if facilities are reasonably necessary to the public welfare).
217 441 U.S. at 509 (quoting 564.54 Acres of Land, 576 F.2d 983, 995 n.16 (3d
Cir. 1978)). The district court also instructed the jury that to award substitute facilities
compensation, it must find that "'the fair market value of the condemned property
[was] substantially less than the cost of constructing functionally equivalent substitute
facilities."' Id. (quoting 564.54 Acres of Land, 576 F.2d at 992 n.9 (3d Cir. 1978)).
288 564.54 Acres of Land, 576 F.2d at 995.
289 See 441 U.S. at 513 (evidence was submitted showing the sale of eleven comparable facilities in the vicinity).
270 See id. at 514. Interestingly, the Court did not consider whether the
grandfathering provisions ran with the land and would have benefitted subsequent purchasers. Under the Court's analysis, if the benefits of the exemption were transferrable,
presumably they would be compensable.
271

Id at 515-16.
at 509 n.3.

2172Id.

273 In Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923), the federal government condemned three-quarters of a town for a reservoir project. As compensation, the federal
government condemned additional private property and proposed to relocate the town
to that new site. The owners of the substitute property challenged the power of the
federal government to take property for purposes of substituting it for other condemned
property. The Court upheld the government's action stating that "[a] method of com-
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years later, in 50 Acres of Land, the Court addressed the issue raised
by its footnote, holding that the substitute facilities method of computing compensation was inappropriate for public as well as private condemnees.27 4 The Supreme Court held that when the fair market value
of property could be ascertained,2 75 the federal government should pay
a public condemnee the same amount as it would pay a private property owner.2 7' The Court justified the fair market value standard by
citing prior decisions holding that just compensation should exclude
subjective values and instead should compensate property owners solely
for those elements of value that are transferrable. 77 According to the
Court, the advantage of excluding subjective values is to reduce the
2 78
"risk of error and prejudice.

What is most problematic about the Court's decision in 50 Acres
of Land, is that in discussing the appropriate measure of compensation
for public entities, the Court failed to consider the differences between
public and private condemnees and the special role states and localities
play in our federal political system. Although the Court seemed to adpensation by substitution would seem to be the best means of making the parties
whole." Id. at 83.
Many lower federal courts had cited this language in holding that compensation
for state and local governments should be measured by the substitute facilities doctrine.
See, e.g., Certain Property In Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d 800, 803 (2d Cir.
1968) ("When the public condemnee proves there is a duty to replace. . . it is entitled
to the cost of constructing a functionally equivalent substitute .

. . .");

United States v.

Certain Parcels of Land, Town of Clarksville, 104 F. Supp. 369, 373 (E.D. Va. 1952)
(the value of public property must be "measured by the cost of a substitute"). Nevertheless, the Court in 564.54 Acres of Land noted that Brown addressed the "scope of
the Government's condemnation power, not the compensation requisite under the Fifth
Amendment." 441 U.S. at 509 n.3; see also United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469
U.S. 24, 33 (1984) ("Brown merely indicates that it would [be] constitutionally permissible for the Federal Government to provide the city with a substitute [facility] instead
of

. .

. cash.").

"" See 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 33-36. The federal government had condemned a sanitary landfill belonging to the City of Duncanville. To replace the landfill,
the city had purchased a parcel of land twice the size of the condemned property. The
court of appeals reversed the district court's decision awarding Duncanville the fair
market value of the site condemned. Instead, the court required the federal government
to pay the city the amount reasonably spent to create a functionally equivalent facility.
See 50 Acres of Land 706 F.2d 1356, 1360 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he reasonable cost of a
functionally equivalent facility is the just measure of compensation when a public entity
is obligated to replace the condemned property."). On retrial the court also required the
jury to discount the cost of the substitute facility to account for its increased capacity
and superior quality. See id. at 1362-63 (noting that even though "Duncanville . . .
gained noticeably from the replacement" the trial court nevertheless failed to "take into
account the need to deduct for the benefits which Duncanville gained").
275 Somewhat surprisingly, the Court found that there was a "fairly robust market for sanitary landfill properties." 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 30.
276 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
277 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 35-36.
278 Id. at 36.
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mit that the lack of full indemnity inherent in fair market value compensation might disrupt states and localities,27 9 it failed to examine the
consequences of such disruptions.
C. Measuring Compensationfor Intergovernmental Condemnees
As demonstrated in Part II, intergovernmental takings can disrupt
states and local governments, threatening the core of independent decision-making power central to our federal political system. Any measure
of compensation which fails to alleviate these disruptions could place
individual states or regions at the mercy of a potentially hostile federal
government. Although the Supreme Court's ruling in 50 Acres of Land
may set an appropriate floor on compensation,'" it fails to ensure that
states and localities will be able to provide the same level of public
goods and services after a condemnation as they had prior to the taking.
Therefore, compensation based upon the fair market value of the property taken fails to protect states and localities from disruption and exploitative rent-seeking.2 '
279 See id. at 34 ("The city's legal obligation to maintain public services that are
interrupted by a federal condemnation does not justify a distinction between public and
private condemnees for the purpose of measuring 'just compensation.'" (footnote omitted)). In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Powell, characteristically showed more solicitude for state and local governments:
When a local governmental entity can prove that the market value of its
property deviates significantly from the make-whole remedy intended by
the Just Compensation Clause and that a substitute facility must be acquired to continue to provide an essential service, limiting compensation to
the fair market value in my view would be manifestly unjust.
Id. at 37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
280 Even in instances in which the state or locality no longer requires a substitute
property after the condemnation, fair market value compensation might still be necessary to avoid economic inefficiency due to fiscal illusion. Although the property no
longer has a "public value" to the state or locality, it nevertheless has an economic
value as fungible property. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
281 The inadequacy of fair market value compensation for certain intergovernmental takings is well-illustrated by federal condemnation of an office building owned by a
locality or state. Public office buildings are frequently located in inner city neighborhoods, many of which have experienced declining property values in recent years. If the
office building were condemned and the court awarded compensation based upon the
property's fair market value, it is likely that it would base the award on sales prices of
other office buildings in the area. The court would adjust the award upward or downward to reflect differences between the condemned building and comparable properties.
See United States v. 0.161 Acres of Land, 837 F.2d 1036, 1044 (11th Cir. 1988) (employing the comparable sales method for downtown property); Hickey v. United States,
208 F.2d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 1953) (approving comparable sales method for downtown
office building), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 919 (1954) ; United States v. 49,375 Square
Feet of Land, 92 F. Supp. 384, 393-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (comparable sales method for
office building better than capitalization of income method), affld sub nom. United
States v. Tishman Realty & Const. Co., 193 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
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To protect their important role in our political system, states and
localities should be compensated according to a method analogous to the
substitute facilities doctrine. When state or local property is condemned
by the federal government, the condemnee should be entitled to receive,
at a minimum, the fair market value of the condemned property. This
minimum award serves the basic requirement of preventing fiscal illusion."' When the state or local government can show that the facility
taken provided a benefit that would not be as fully provided after the
condemnation,2 8 it should be entitled to compensation based upon the
amount it would cost to replace2" 4 the condemned property. 8 5
928 (1952). If, as is likely, the state or locality were unable to purchase an equivalent
building suited to its needs, and found it necessary to construct a new facility, "comparable sales" compensation (based on the depressed property values in the surrounding
community) would be inadequate to cover the cost of building a new facility. Thus,
while compensation based upon comparable sales may adequately compensate private
investors who view their property as fungible, such a measure of compensation could
well be inadequate for public entities which must construct alternative facilities in order to continue providing public services.
282 See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
283 In determining whether states and cities should be awarded an amount to replace the property condemned, the "reasonable necessity" standard of the substitute
facilities doctrine, see supra note 257 and accompanying text, is difficult to reconcile
with a recognition of the value of state and local decision-making authority. In applying
the reasonable necessity standard, federal judges must substitute their own views regarding the need for public services in place of decisions made by duly elected state and
local legislators. See Note, Just Compensation and the Public Condemnee, 75 YALE
L.J. 1053, 1055 (1966) (issue of necessity of public projects is inappropriate for judicial
determination). Nevertheless, merely requiring that the substitute facility serve a rational governmental purpose, see id., seems to be an open invitation for tenuous rationalizations geared to obtaining as much money from the federal fisc as possible. A more
objective standard based upon whether the community has been harmed as a result of
the taking is more desirable. This was the test adopted by the Third Circuit in 564.54
Acres Of Land, 576 F.2d at 995, (discussed supra text accompanying note 268).
28" It is possible that the federal government may occasionally condemn state or
local property which is not replaceable. For example, certain public facilities such as
harbors and parks may be tied to specific geographic locations. If the public entity can
show that the facility taken provides a benefit which would not be provided as fully
after condemnation, a dilemma would be presented. On the one hand, the federal government should be able to acquire the property to exercise fully its constitutional powers. Nevertheless, because replacement is impossible, states and localities would be subject to disruption and potential exploitation as a result of the condemnation. In these
unusual circumstances, courts may be required to step in to ensure that the taking is
necessary to achieve a legitimate governmental objective. Cf United States v. Ptasynski,
462 U.S. 74, 85 (1983) ("where Congress does choose to frame a tax in geographic
terms, we will examine the classification closely to see if there is actual geographic
discrimination [in violation of the tax uniformity clause].") Courts applying this type of
"close" scrutiny should be especially sensitive to possible motives of interstate discrimination and exploitation; they should invalidate condemnations of non-substitutable
property that are unnecessary and disruptive.
2I Public condemnees should be awarded compensation for replacement only in
instances where the cost of replacement exceeds the condemned property's fair market
value. If replacement cost is less than fair market value, fair market value is the appro-
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In instances where the condemned property includes improvements
such as structures or equipment, however, an award based upon full
replacement cost might be inappropriate. If the condemned facility's remaining useful life is less than that of the replacement facility, an
award based upon full replacement cost might place the public condemnee in a better economic position after the taking than it had enjoyed prior to condemnation. This potential windfall to state and local
condemnees could promote government inefficiency by creating an additional incentive for federal legislators to support federal projects whose
overall costs exceed benefits, but which nonetheless generate significant
local benefits.2 "
priate measure of compensation so as to eliminate the possibility of fiscal illusion.
Compensation based upon replacement cost should not, with due respect to the
Court in 50 Acres of Land, be exceedingly more complex and subjective than computing the fair market value of property. As recent hearings before Congress indicate,
appraisal standards are notoriously complex and manipulable, providing numerous opportunities for interested parties to ensure that their desired valuation and the one produced by the appraiser coincide. See HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, IMPACT
OF APPRAISAL PROBLEMS ON REAL ESTATE LENDING, MORTGAGE INSURANCE, AND
INVESTMENT IN THE SECONDARY MARKET, H.R. REP. No. 891, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.

42-43 (1986); Impact of Faulty and FraudulentReal Estate Appraisals on Federally
Insured Financial Institutions and Related Agencies of the Federal Government:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the
House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1421-44 (1985); Barnett, A
Proposal for Regulating Real Estate Appraisals: Structuring Deterrents in a Permissive
System, 11, 14 (Feb. 8, 1988) (unpublished student paper, Yale School of Law).
Experience in eminent domain proceedings also supports the proposition that estimation of the fair market value of property is less than an exact science. See United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1943) (appraisal unlikely to reflect market
value "with nicety"; where property in vicinity has not been sold recently and in significant amounts the application of the fair market value standard "involves, at best, a
guess by informed persons."); 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 1, at
§ 12.31 [2] (stating that the "market value of a piece of real estate is not ordinarily the
subject of ready computation"). In the absence of impropriety by state and local officials, the value of replacement property could be accurately measured by the price paid.
Although some difficult adjustments might need to be made to accommodate the
purchase of properties that go beyond mere replacement, or to take into account financing arrangements, it is by no means clear that the method of computation is either more
complex or more subjective than computing fair market value. See Durham, supra note
250, at 1292 (valuation of substitute facility unlikely to be more difficult than valuing
condemned property); Note, Restoration Costs As An Alternative Measure of Severance Damages In Eminent Domain Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 800, 806 (1969)
(noting that the "cost of restoration standard is probably more objective than the fair
market value standard"). Furthermore, similar methods of compensation based on
"equivalent reinstatement" have frequently been used in Canada and England to compensate persons whose property was appropriated by the national government. See Cullingworth, Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Canada, 7 URB. L. & POL'Y 385, 39293 (1985); Denyer-Green, Eminent Domain: A ComparativeDiscussion on the Assessment of Compensation in the United States and England, 50 APPRAISAL J. 212, 21617 (April 1982).
2" See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the tendency
of Members of Congress to engage in porkbarrel politics.
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Compensation for intergovernmental condemnees should promote
efficient government action as well as limit the potential for interstate
exploitation. While intergovernmental condemnees should be entitled to
an award that will enable them to continue providing the same public
goods and services as they had prior to the condemnation, they should
not be overcompensated. Thus, while the compensation award should
be based upon replacement cost, an amount representing the actual economic depreciation187 of the condemned property should be deducted
from the compensation award. Although compensation based upon replacement cost minus economic depreciation may be less than the full
cost of acquiring an equivalent, substitute facility, or rebuilding the
condemned property, in most cases the public condemnee should be
able to finance the shortfall through its capital budget.2 " Therefore,
this method of calculating compensation awards should achieve the
twin objectives of promoting efficient government action and limiting
the ability of the federal government to disrupt states and localities.
117 See C. SIRMANS, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 166 (1985) (distinguishing between

real, economic depreciation, and accounting or tax depreciation).
288 States and localities regularly finance capital projects by issuing bonds. See
generally M. GELFAND, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING § 1:04

(1987); W. OATES, supra note 159, at 153-61; Durning, The New Capital Market
Heavyweights, 61 J. STATE Gov'T 124, 125-26 (1988). The ability of a public condemnee to finance the portion of the cost of the substitute facility that has been deducted as depreciation ensures that the condemnee receives full, but no more than full,
indemnification. For example, assume that a particular type of facility has a useful life
of 50 years, depreciates in value in equal increments each year, and costs $10,000,000
to reconstruct in current dollars. Further assume that the federal government condemns
the facility after it has been in service 10 years. If the government were to compensate
the condemnee based upon the method advocated herein, the state or locality would
receive an award of $8,000,000 [$10,000,000 - 10/50 ($10,000,000)]. The state or locality could then issue bonds to make up the additional $2,000,000 of the cost to rebuild
or replace the condemned facility. This method of compensation not only serves to prevent disruption of the state or locality, it also puts the state in a position economically
equivalent to the one it had been in prior to the condemnation with an asset worth
$10,000,000, and a corresponding liability of $2,000,000.
States and localities may, however, be vulnerable to disruption and exploitation if
they are unable to borrow in the capital markets either because of poor credit ratings,
see M. SHEFTER, supra note 107, at 127-48 (describing New York City's experience),
or because of state limitations on debt, see, e.g., IOWA CONST. art XI, § 3 (limits
annual aggregate indebtedness to five percent of taxable property in locality); M. GELFAND, supra, at § 9 (discussing state constitutional and statutory debt ceilings). Such
instances present a tradeoff between protecting states and localities from disruption, and
promoting economic efficiency. Although the choice between these objectives is by no
means clear, based upon my belief in the importance of protecting states from disruption and exploitation, I am inclined toward a compensation rule which does not deduct
depreciation from awards to intergovernmental condemnees when the public entity can
demonstrate: 1) that the public facility taken provided a benefit that would not be as
fully provided after the condemnation, see supra note 283, 2) that it has insufficient
funds to cover the difference between the cost to replace and the property's depreciated
value, and 3) that it cannot borrow those funds in the capital market. See supra.
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CONCLUSION

The specter of interstate exploitation, central to this article's critique of current condemnation jurisprudence, is admittedly less prominent today than it was at the framing of the Constitution. It is perhaps
a tribute to the system created by the Framers that in a nation of such
magnitude and diversity as the United States, regional tension has
erupted so infrequently. Nevertheless, the principle that the integrity of
states must be preserved is implicit in the Constitution; the means to
single out and harm individual states or regions must be kept from the
national government.
Perhaps the greatest achievement of these constitutional protections goes beyond the fact that they have, to a large extent, worked as
intended. These same constitutional principles have also had an educative effect, making open and intense regional warfare less a possibility
in the minds of American citizens. Nevertheless, as recent events have
demonstrated, regionalism is not a concern that can be relegated to the
past. Interstate rivalry, especially over economic issues, is as strong today as it has been in decades. Gaps in our constitutional protections
against interstate conflict must be filled, rather than papered over. Recent jurisprudence regarding federal condemnations of state and local
property has failed to acknowledge that compensation is of a piece with
other constitutional protections of federalism. Restoring full indemnification for intergovernmental takings is necessary, not only to promote
economic efficiency, and preserve the integrity of our federal system,
but also to reinforce the constitutional barrier against regional conflict.

